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Commodities futures trading on the national exchanges has grown
spectacularly during the past decade.' This increase requires special
vigilance against the possibility of attempts to manipulate market
prices. While the Commodity Exchange Act2 (the Act) does not contain a
definition of the term "manipulation,"' it nevertheless bristles with pro-
visions dealing with market manipulation of other forms of market
disorders. A review of this statutory base dealing with market manipula-
tion, and of the formative case law on the subject, provides a much-
needed survey of the murky legal boundaries of manipulative behavior.4
I. Statutory Bases of Market Manipulation
Section 3 of the Act' recites the congressional purpose of the statute
and states that "the transaction and prices of commodities on such
boards of trade are susceptible to speculation, manipulation, and control,
and sudden or unreasonable fluctuations in the prices thereof frequently
occur as a result of such speculation, manipulation or control... ." The in-
frequency of manipulation suits under the Act raises doubt concerning
the accuracy of the foregoing statement, but section 3 helps never-
theless to illustrate the basic anti-manipulation focus of the Act.
See FUTURES INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, INC., Bull. Nos. 3884 & 3903 (1980).
7 U.S.C. §§ 1-22 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
Even though the Commodity Exchange Act (the Act) does not contain a definition of
the term "manipulation," it has been held that this omission does not render the Act uncon-
stitutional. Bartlett Frazier Co. v. Hyde, 65 F.2d 350 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 654
(1933). Evidently, the question of vagueness has not arisen in a criminal prosecution for
manipulation, where the standard is generally higher. See, e.g., United States v. La Mantia,
[1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) § 20,667 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
' See generally Harrington, The Manipulation of Commodity Futures Prices, 55 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 240 (1981); Hieronymus, Manipulation in Commodity Futures Trading:
Toward a Definition, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 41 (1977).
a 7 U.S.C. § 5 (1976).
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Section 4a,8 authorizing the Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sion (the Commission) to establish daily trading and position limits for
speculators, adopts section 3's phraseology with respect to "sudden or
unreasonable [price] fluctuations" and also speaks of "unwarranted
changes in the price" of a commodity. However, section 4a is expressly
concerned with "excessive speculation," which is identified in section 3
as a danger separate from manipulation and control of the market, and
thus is not specifically an anti-manipulation provision. Rather, section 4a
seems to focus upon market disorders attributable to unbridled specula-
tive activity, without regard to whether that speculative frenzy has a
manipulative purpose. It should be noted, moreover, that the regulations
adopted by the Commission under section 4a contain a warning that com-
pliance with the daily trading and position limits "shall [not] be con-
strued to affect any provision of the Act relating to manipulation or cor-
ners, nor to relieve any contract market or its governing board from
responsibility under section 5(d) of the Act to prevent manipulation and
corners."' Thus, the Commission acknowledges that the potential for
manipulation and corners continues to exist even if the daily trading and
position limits have dampened "excessive speculation."
Section 5(d)8 imposes upon all boards of trade, as a condition for
designation as a contract market, that their governing boards must pro-
vide for "the prevention of manipulation of prices and the cornering of
any commodity by the dealers or operators upon such board." The Com-
mission has adopted a "Guideline"9 for contract markets describing the
type of surveillance expected of them to fulfill their section 5(d) duty.
The guideline states that the Commission does not "expect contract
market enforcement programs to prevent or detect all instances of ex-
change rule violation," but does expect that such programs will be
"reasonably calculated" to enforce those rules.
Section 5a(4),'0 setting further conditions for contract market
designation, contains the Act's only reference to the prevention of
"squeezes," a phenomenon described later in this Article 1 that may con-
stitute a market manipulation if the requisite intent is present. Section
5a(4) deals with the creation of a period for actual deliveries of the com-
modity on the futures contract after the market has ceased trading in
the contract, and relates that period of the prevention of "squeezes" and
"market congestion" endangering price stability.
' Id. § 6a.
' CFTC Limits on Positions, 17 C.F.R. §§ 150.1-.12 (1980).
a 7 U.S.C. § 7(d) (1976).
' Guideline for Contract Market Enforcement Program, [1975-1977 Transfer Binder]
Comm. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,042 (1975); Contract Market Rule Enforcement Program
Guidelines No.2, [Current] Comm. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 6430 (1975).
7 U.S.C. § 7a(4) (1976).
" See section II. C. infra.
1981]
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Section 5a(1O)" authorizes the Commission to compel a contract
market to adopt delivery points (i.e., locations), and price differentials for
delivery of differing grades of a commodity, "as will tend to prevent or
diminish price manipulation, market congestion, or the abnormal move-
ment of such commodity in interstate commerce."
Sections 5b'3 and 6(a)" of the Act are concerned with enforcement ac-
tions by the Commission against a contract market for failing to comply
with the Act or the Commission's rules, regulations and orders there-
under. Expressly mentioned in section 6(a) is a failure by a contract
market to enforce "its rules of government made a condition of its
designation as set forth in section 5 of this Act," which would include a
failure to enforce its anti-manipulation rules under section 5(d). And sec-
tion 6b,"1 governing Commission actions against contract markets
leading to cease-and-desist orders and civil penalties, contains a similar
reference to the contract market's failure to enforce such rules.
Sections 6(b) 6 and 6(c)' deal with enforcement actions against per-
sons other than contract markets. Indeed, contract markets are express-
ly excluded from the coverage of those sections. Both provisions make
specific reference to "manipulating or attempting to manipulate" cash
commodity prices and futures prices.
A comparison of sections 5b and 6(a), concerning contract markets,
with section 6(b) and 6(c) governing all other persons, reveals that
manipulation is not even mentioned in the former provisions while it is
the first-mentioned violation in the latter sections. An inference can be
drawn that Congress did not view the contract markets as potential
manipulators, while the risk of manipulation by other persons was clear-
ly and prominently recognized by the Congress. The absence in sections
5b and 6(a) of any reference to manipulation by a contract market, and
the emphasis in section 5(d) on the role of contract markets in preventing
manipulation by others dealing or operating on those exchanges, raise
serious doubt whether a charge *of "manipulation" leveled directly
against a contract market is compatible with the Act's language.
Moreover, as a practical matter, contract markets are incapable of
market manipulation in the usual meaning of that term since they do not
trade in the markets and, accordingly, cannot place pressure on prices
through purchases or sales of cash commodities or futures contracts. At
most, the contract markets may adopt rules or policies to which traders
may react in the market-often in unpredictable ways-but the estab-
lishment of those rules or policies is not "manipulation" within any
familiar meaning of that term. If a contract market rule or policy could
12 7 U.S.C. § 7a(1O) (1976).
,3 Id. § 7b.
Id. § 8(a).
Id. § 13a.
16 Id. § 9.
" Id. § 13b.
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be shown to have created an environment or opportunity for manipula-
tion by traders, it might be criticized as a failure to provide for the
prevention of manipulation under section 5(d), but it does not follow that
a charge of actual manipulation by the contract market would be either
accurate or appropriate. 8
Section 6c of the Act 9 authorizes the Commission to institute in a
federal district court an injunction action against a contract market or
other person for violating the Act or for "restraining trading in any com-
modity for future delivery." As written, section 6c could be construed to
make "restraining trading" a basis for injunctive relief separate from a
violation of the Act or of any rule, regulation or order of the Commission
thereunder. If so, "restraining trading" is not the same as a market
manipulation, since the latter is embraced by the section's separate
reference to Act violations. The phrase "restraining trading" has not
been construed by the courts.
Section 8a(6)20 empowers the Commision to communicate to the con-
tract markets "the full facts concerning any transaction or market opera-
tion, including the names of parties thereto, which in the judgment of
the Commission disrupts or tends to disrupt any market ... ." While
this language is broader than the circumstances evidencing a true
manipulation, it clearly encompasses market conditions of that nature.
Section 8a(7)2' authorizes the Commission to alter or supplement con-
tract market rules under various circumstances, including "for the pro-
tection of traders or to insure fair dealing in commodities traded for
future delivery on such contract market." The breadth of that language,
as well as other phraseology dealing with the protection of commodity
merchants and consumers, suggest that section 8a(7) may be available to
the Commission to alter or supplement exchange rules for anti-
manipulation purposes.
Section 8a(9),22 governing the Commission's issuance of emergency
orders to contract markets, expressly identifies "threatened or actual
market manipulations and corners" as grounds for such action.
Section 9(b) makes it a felony punishable by a fine of up to $500,000
($100,000 for individuals) and imprisonment of not more than five years,
for any person "to manipulate or attempt to manipulate the price of any
11 Occasionally, charges of manipulation have been leveled against contract markets by
private litigants. A contract market will not be held to have manipulated a market through
regulatory actions or decisions if the conduct accords with its rules and is taken in good
faith. Lagorio v. Board of Trade of Chicago, 529 F.2d 1290 (7th Cir. 1976); P.J. Taggares Co.
v. New York Mercantile Exchange, 476 F. Supp. 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). See also Chicago Mer-
cantile Exchange, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. FUT. L. REP. (CH) 120,436 (1977).
" 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1 (1976).
'0 Id. § 12a(6).
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commodity in interstate commerce, or for future delivery on or subject
to the rules of any contract market, or to corner or attempt to corner
any such commodity. . . ." Manipulations and corners, therefore, are
among the most serious crimes created by the Act.
Finally, section 17(b)(7),11 establishing the conditions for registration
as a futures association, requires that each such futures association must
have rules designed to prevent "manipulative acts and practices" and to
"remove impediments to ... free and open futures trading."
II. The Terminology of Manipulation
As noted earlier, the Act does not contain a definition of manipula-
tion. A challenge to the constitutionality of the Act for that reason was
unsuccessful.25 Instead, the task has been left to the federal courts to
identify the characteristics and attributes of an unlawful manipulation.
To date, the United States Supreme Court has refused to consider the
issue, so that federal appellate decisions are the highest source of
authority.
The principal cases addressing the manipulation issue are discussed
below. As preface, however, it is useful to highlight in general terms the
distinctions drawn in this Article between a price "manipulation," a com-
modity "corner," and an intentional "squeeze." These terms are
sometimes used interchangeably in the case law, but will be given more
precise meaning here.
A. "Price Manipulation"
The phrase "price manipulation" as used in this Article means the
elimination of effective price competition in a market for cash com-
modities and/or futures contracts through the domination of either supp-
ly or demand, and the exercise of that domination to intentionally pro-
duce artificially high or low prices. Price manipulation is kindred to the
exercise of monopoly power to dictate prices that would be unachievable
in a truly competitive environment. The existence of a price manipula-
tion is largely a factual question involving determinations whether the
requisite domination or monopoly exists, whether an artificial price is
caused by the exercise of that power, and whether the dominant party
intended to bring about that artificial price.
B. "Corner"
For purposes of this Article, the term "corner" means control or
domination of the available supply of a cash commodity. Since a corner
depends upon the existence of a fixed supply of the commodity that can
Id. § 21(b)(7).
Bartlett Frazier Co. v. Hyde, 65 F.2d 350 (7th Cir. 1933); see note 3 supra.
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be effectively controlled, the term cannot properly be applied to futures
contracts where the supply can be dramatically changed by the uncon-
trollable entry or exit of market participants at any time. The word "cor-
ner" is not used here to describe concentrated ownership of a commodity
by persons for commercial or other nonmarket purposes, but is limited
to concentrations of supply that are achieved for the specific purpose of
influencing market prices of the cash commodity or its related futures
contract. For example, the supply is "cornered" if it is captured by
"long" futures traders for the purpose of making it unavailable to
"shorts" for delivery, so that the latter are forced to settle their con-
tracts with the "longs" at inflated prices. The supply is also "cornered" if
it is controlled by "short" futures traders for the purpose of depressing
futures prices through massive deliveries of the commodity into the
futures market.
C. Intentional "Squeeze"
An intentional "squeeze" has all the attributes of a price manipula-
tion, with a single exception. The scarcity of cash supplies available to
"shorts" for delivery purposes exists through no active effort of a "long"
into the market, but is due to other conditions such as drought, heavy ex-
ports, hoarding by commercial users or transportation interruptions. In
all other repects, however, the conduct of the "long" during an inten-
tional squeeze is indistinguishable from a price manipulation: the de-
mand ("long") side of the futures contract is dominated by them and is
used to intentionally create artificially high prices.
D. Downward Price Manipulation or Squeeze
A downward price manipulation or intentional downward price
"4squeeze" is extremely rare and has been alleged in only two reported
cases.28 This technique is possible if "short" futures traders were to cap-
ture large supplies of the underlying cash commodity and engage in
massive deliveries of those supplies into the futures market. The
resulting downward pressure on market prices, as "longs" rush to get
out, would enhance the value of any remaining "short" futures contracts.
If their intent is to create artificially low prices, a "short" manipulation
will occur. However, the vast majority of price manipulations and
squeezes are effected on the "long" side of the market, for the purpose of
raising prices to artificial levels.n For that reason, the remaining discus-
' In re Hohenberg Brothers Cotton Co., [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Comm. FUT. L.
REP. (CCH) 120,146 (1976), affd, [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] CoMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH)
120,271 (1977); In re Vincent W. Kosuga, 19 Agri. Dec. 603 (1960).
" It might be hypothesized that "long" manipulations are more common because the
capital required to carry them off may be significantly less than for a "short" manipulation.
Especially where conditions exist for a "natural squeeze," brought about by a shortage of
1981]
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sion of market manipulation, corners and intentional "squeezes" will
focus on the more common "long" or upward price phenomenon.
III. The Attributes of Market Manipulation
Basically, the principal characteristics of a manipulation are the
ability to influence market prices, the intent to do so, and the accom-
plishment of that purpose to create artificially high or low prices.28 If
any one of these three features is absent, a market manipulation will not
occur. On the other hand, it must be remembered that section 6(b) and
section 9(b)30 of the Act proscribe manipulative attempts as well as suc-
cesses.
Under normal competitive circumstances, no single trader or concert
of traders can exert the necessary economic power to dictate the direc-
tion or level of market prices. There are simply too many other com-
petitors in the market exercising independent judgment, and the in-
fluence of any discrete trader is neutralized by the trading activity of
others. Market trends thus depend upon a concensus of diverse and unaf-
filiated traders, interpreting and reacting to their own private percep-
tions of economic factors.
To create a competitive imbalance, therefore, it is necessary for the
aspiring manipulator to gain economic power that is disproportionate to
other traders. The accumulation of that power, that ability, requires the
achievement of effective control over what other traders need to fulfill
their obligations. In commodity markets, this means control of the supp-
ly of the underlying cash commodity available for delivery, or control of
one "side" of the futures contract, or both. Domination of the available
cash supply can prevent other traders from acquiring the cash commo-
dity for delivery purposes except, of course, at a price set unilaterally by
the controlling party. This is a "corner" as used in this Article. Control
of one "side" of the futures contract can effectively force other traders
to deal with the controlling party in order to "offset" their futures con-
tracts, thus giving the controlling party an ability to dictate offset
prices, provided that the cash commodity is not readily available to
other traders as an alternative means of satisfying their obligations.
Therefore, a successful manipulation of the futures market requires con-
trol of both means of contract satisfaction: (1) delivery of the cash com-
modity; and (2) offset of positions in the futures market. When control of
both elements is achieved, the conditions for a "classical" market
supplies, a manipulator can achieve his aim through acquisition of futures contracts alone,
on small margin. A "short" manipulation, on the other hand, may require incurring the large
expense of acquiring both the physical commodity and a controlling short futures position.
An artificially high or low price may be an unchanged price when a strengthening or
weakening of'the price would otherwise occur. See text accompanying notes 172-74 infra.
- 7 U.S.C. § 9 (1976); see text accompanying note 16 supra.
- 7 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1976); see text accompanying note 23 supra.
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manipulation are present. And, where control over offset is present but
delivery is foreclosed due to natural dr normal cash supply shortage, the
conditions exist for a "squeeze."
The case law indicates that the first inquiry is whether the accused
person has this ability to influence market prices. If the respondent or
defendant lacks the requisite economic power, it is clear that no charge
of manipulation can properly be leveled against him. To survey the ques-
tion of economic power, the courts generally review the conditions exist-
ing in the market for both delivery and offset.
A. Available Supply-Grades, Locations, and Eligibility
With respect to whether the accused has successfully foreclosed
competition in the delivery of the commodity, the courts have sought
first to identify the "available supply" of the underlying cash commodity
at the time of the alleged manipulation. This exercise will be familiar to
antitrust practitioners who are acquainted with "relevant market"
analyses in restraint of trade, monopoly and divestiture suits. As in
those controversies, moreover, the definition of "available supply," both
in terms of identity and time, can foretell the success or failure of the
proceeding.
Invariably included in the "available supply" are quantities of the
primary ("par"l grade of the underlying cash commodity that are at the
location where delivery on the futures contract can be made and that are
already qualified for delivery under pertinent contract market rules. In
Peto v. Howell,3' the available supply clearly inchided all number 2
yellow corn in store in Chicago grain elevators that were regular 32 for
delivery on the Chicago Board of Trade's July 1931 corn futures con-
tract. In General Foods Corp. v. Brannan3 3 the available supply included
all rye in deliverable position in Chicago for the Chicago Board of
Trade's May 1944 rye futures dontract. In Great Western Food
Distributors, Inc. v. Brannan,4 the available supply included
refrigerator eggs in Chicago that were deliverable on the Chicago Mer-
cantile Exchange's (CME's) December 1947 egg futures contract. Similar-
ly, the available supply in G.H. Miller & Co. v. United States" embraced
refrigerator eggs in deliverable position in Chicago on the. CME's.
December 1952 egg futures contract. In Volkart Brothers, Inc. v.
Freeman3 the available supply was defined to include all certificated
3, 101 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1938). See also Indiana Farm Bureau Cooperative Ass'n,
[1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 120,964 (1979).
3 The term "regular" means that the commodity has been qualified for delivery under
the rules of the contract market. This may entail certification or registration of title
documents with the exchange, or similar procedures.
w 170 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1948).
201 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1953).
260 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1958).
311 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1962).
1981]
734 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXVIII
cotton at ports deliverable on the October 1957 cotton futures contracts
of the New York and New Orleans cotton exchanges. And, in Cargil4 Inc.
v. Hardin,7 the court of appeals found that the available supply included
number 2 soft red winter wheat situated in Chicago elevators and eligi-
ble for delivery on the Chicago Board of Trade's May 1963 wheat futures
contract. Thus, the exact grade of the cash commodity called for in the
futures contract and delivered without premium or discount will be in-
cluded in the calculation of "available supply" if located and qualified
where deliveries are permitted. A possible exception to this general
rule, however, is supplies of the "par" commodity in deliverable location
and condition that are already irrevocably committed to another pur-
pose, such as to a firm export sale or to a processing plant, and that can-
not be feasibly replaced with other stock in time to fulfill those com-
mitments2
A more difficult definitional problem in regard to "available supply"
arises when a futures contract permits deliveries of grades of the cash
commodity that differ from "par," or allows for delivery of the same
grade of the cash commodity from locations outside the primary delivery
area. In either case, the cost to the "shorts" of making delivery may be
significantly greater than if "par" grade at the primary delivery point
were delivered. When these "off-grade" or "out-of-town" cash supplies
are deliverable, the courts have decided whether or not to include them
in "available supply" depending upon the amount of additional expense
that the "shorts" would incur in making delivery of those supplies in
satisfaction of their futures contracts. Both quality and locational dif-
ferences were confronted by the court of appeals in Great Western Food
Distributors.9 There, the CME's egg futures contract defined a "par"
delivery as refrigerator eggs in Chicago storage." However, it also per-
mitted the delivery of fresh eggs, a grade of eggs that normally carried a
higher price than refrigerator eggs, but no premium was allowed to the
"shorts" if they delivered fresh eggs.41 The futures contract also allowed
delivery of out-of-town refrigerator eggs, but at an additional cost to the
"shorts" of $315 per carlot for freight and equalizing factors.42 The court
of appeals noted not only the added expense to "shorts" in delivering
fresh eggs and out-of-town refrigerator eggs, but also found that these
supplies were seldom resorted to for delivery purposes.43 From these
3 452 F.2d 1154 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 932 (1972).
1 In some cases, the storage facilities where deliverable supplies are located are own-
ed by large commercial firms that may have already committed part of their stocks to
customers. These committed stocks are not truly "available" to shorts for delivery unless it
is determined that the commitment is not truly binding or that the commitment can be met
from stocks not in deliverable position.
39 201 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1953).
40 Id. at 480.
41 Id.
42 Id.
'1 Id. at 480-81.
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findings, the court concluded that the "economic impediment" to
delivery of fresh eggs and out-of-town refrigerator eggs warranted ex-
cluding them from the calculation of "available supply."" Moreover, the
court expressed the view that this "economic impediment" could only be
eliminated if the price of local "par" eggs were raised to the same level,
a likely sign of local market manipulation:
[O]ut of town eggs are economically excluded from the con-
templated available supply, unless, of course, the price of local
eggs is raised to the Chicago level of out of towns. But this, it
would appear, will not occur unless control of the local supply is
acquired by one who intentionally raises the price of Chicago re-
frigerator eggs to the level of out of towns. This, of itself, would
constitute an arbitrary fixing of prices."
A similar analysis and conclusion can be found in the Cargill case.46
There, the wheat futures contract of the Chicago Board of Trade called
for "par" delivery of number 2 soft red winter wheat but also allowed
delivery of higher priced hard wheat.47 No premium, however, was given
to "shorts" for delivering hard wheat.48 The court of appeals noted that
hard wheat would have to be transported by "shorts" to Chicago from
other locations in order to effect delivery, an additional expense or
"economic impediment."49 It was further found that hard wheat was rare-
ly delivered. 0 Thus, the court determined to exclude hard wheat from
the "available supply" and, as in Great Western Food Distributors, con-
cluded that the price of hard wheat did little more than signify the upper
limit to which local wheat prices might be manipulated:
Hard wheat was of a higher grade than No. 2 soft red winter
wheat, its price was higher, no premium was allowed for its
delivery, and the cost of shipment into Chicago for delivery on
the future was an additional economic impediment to its
delivery. It would be more economic to pay the long'a premium
than to pay the additional charges for premium wheat plus ship-
ping and handling charges.5 1
* * *
[W]e have been shown no good reason why the futures price
should reflect the cost of bringing in a higher price and grade of
wheat for which there is no demand in the local area. It is this
44 Id.
41 Id. at 481.
" 452 F.2d 1154 (8th Cir. 1971).
4T Id. at 1165.
"Id.
" Id. at 1165-66.
o Id. at 1167.
5' Id. at 1165-66.
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price which was artificially high and therefore useless to the
trade and nation.
52
A somewhat different problem of defining "available supply" arose
in Volkart Brothers. There, the cotton futures contracts of the New
York and New Orleans exchanges permitted delivery of only "certifi-
cated" cotton in storage in those two cities. 4 The evidence showed that
the amount of certificated cash cotton on October 15, 1957-the final day
for trading in the October 1957 futures contract on the two ex-
changes-was only about 50 percent of what would be needed by
"shorts" if all of them wished to make deliveries.5 Volkart argued,
however, that there were 1,250,000 bales of uncertificated cotton in
store at delivery locations and that these stocks should be included in
the "available supply" because, prior to October 15, the "shorts" could
have and should have had those stock certificated in preparation for
fulfilling their delivery obligation. 6 Thus, Volkart presented the ques-
tion whether supplies of the cash commodity, of the proper grade and in
the right location for delivery, can be excluded from "available supply"
simply because they had not completed the certification process as re-
quired by exchange rules. The court of appeals held that uncertificated
cotton that was barred from delivery only because the "shorts" had fail-
ed to seek certification in a timely manner was includable in the
"available supply."" It appeared, from the court's opinion, that certifica-
tion of the 1,250,000 bales of cotton would not have been a major ex-
pense-an "economic impediment" -for the "shorts."58 Thus, Volkart
may not have posed the problem of Great Western or Cargill where in-
clusion of cash supplies of higher grade or distant locations might tacitly
condone the manipulation of local "par" prices up to the same level as
those supplies.
B. Available Supply- When Calculated
The time when an "available supply" calculation is made can be
critical. Typically, the government urges that "available supply" should
include only those stocks that are present on the date or dates when the
manipulation is alleged to have occurred. On the other hand, respon-
dents usually urge that "available supply" should include all stock that
"shorts", acting responsibly, could bring into deliverable position by the
end of the futures contract's delivery period. The former approach, of
52 Id. at 1173.
311 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1962).
' Id. at 56.
55 Id.
Id. at 57.
s7 Id. at 59-60.
58 Id.
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course, encourages a finding of "available supply" that is smaller than if
the calculation were based upon the latter formulation.
In Volkart Brothers, the government urged that the "available
supply" should be calculated as of October 15, 1957, the final day of
futures trading in the October 1957 cotton futures contracts and the
date on which the market manipulation allegedly occurred.59 The govern-
ment reasoned that, as of that date, it was too late for "shorts" to buy
and to have certificated the 1,250,000 additional bales of cotton located
at delivery points." Thus, under the government's theory, the total
"available supply" -excluding Volkart's cotton inventory-was roughly
5,000 bales of certificated cotton to meet the delivery needs of "shorts"
having futures obligations of 13,400 bales.6 1 To get additional cotton for
delivery, the "shorts" would have to purchase from Volkart's own inven-
tory up to 7,100 bales." However, Volkart argued that October 15 was
not the proper date for calculating "available supply" since, had the
"shorts" acted only one or two days earlier to achieve certification of the
1,250,000 bales, that additional cotton could have been delivered on the
futures contract. 3 Thus, well over a million bales of properly graded and
located cotton would have been among the "available supply" for use by
"shorts" in satisfying their delivery obligation of only 13,400 bales. The
court of appeals in Volkart adopted the respondent's theory on the ra-
tionale that the "shorts" had an opportunity to gain ample supplies prior
to October 15 and, for that reason, the "available supply" should include
the uncertificated as well as the certificated cotton.14 The court stated
that, to confine the "available supply" to October 15, when the "shorts"
had forfeited their opportunity to qualify the uncertificated cotton for
delivery, would in effect excuse the "shorts" from "the performance of
their contracts and from the exercise of due diligence to that end...
In the Cargill case, which roundly criticized Volkart in certain
respects,66 the calculation of "available supply" was based upon stocks of
soft red winter wheat in deliverable position on May 21, 1963, the final
day of futures trading and the date of the alleged manipulation."
However, the facts of the case did not present the same question as in
Volkart since it does not appear that efforts by "shorts" to procure sup-
"2 Id. at 56-57.
I d.




Id. at 60. The court in Volkart did not, however, pinpoint a particular date prior to
October 15 as the proper date to calculate "available supply," noting merely that the shorts
who tendered the uncertificated cotton on the contract had acquired it prior to that date.
Id. at 59.
See 452 F.2d at 1166; text accompanying note 74 infra.
8? 452 F.2d at 1157, 1160.
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plies prior to May 21 would have been fruitful. On April 12, 1963, more
than a month prior to the final trading day, Cargill owned 2,471,000
bushels of deliverable grade wheat out of a total of 2,804,000 bushels at
delivery points. 8 Thus, even at that early date, there were only 333,000
bushels of deliverable wheat available from sources other than Cargill to
meet a potential "short" delivery need that appears to have exceeded
8,000,000 bushels. 9 Moreover, the court found that out-of-town wheat
that might have been brought into Chicago for delivery was of the hard
wheat variety, which it excluded from the "available supply" as discussed
earlier," and it can therefore be inferred that no other supplies of the
deliverable grade of wheat were within the reach of "shorts" even prior
to the final day of futures trading. 1 From April 15 to May 21, 1963, the
available supply of deliverable wheat dwindled, due in part to a ship-
ment out of Chicago by Cargill of 770,000 bushels to fulfill an export sale,
and on May 21 there were only 20,000 bushels of deliverable wheat
available to "shorts" from sources other than Cargill.7 2 All other
deliverable stocks, including those owned by Cargill, were committed to
purposes other than the futures market, such as milling and cash trans-
actions. On these facts, the issue did not directly arise whether
"shorts" had acted irresponsibly in failing to seek out other supplies of
soft red winter wheat which, from every indication, simply were not ob-
tainable elsewhere either on May 21, 1963 or on earlier dates ap-
proaching that final day of futures trading. Even so, the court of appeals
in Cargill criticized the Volkart decision as condoning manipulative
squeezes and for stressing too heavily the obligation of "shorts" to make
reasonable and timely preparation for delivery. 4 This attack was large-
ly gratuitous, it would seem, considering that the Cargill case did not
present the court with facts showing that "shorts" had been dilatory in
obtaining readily available stocks, as in Volkart.
In Great Western Food Distributors, the court of appeals traced the
respondent's accumulation of Chicago cash eggs throughout December of
1947 and concluded that, subsequent to December 115, Great Western
had gained effective control of the Chicago cash eggs supply. 5 Thus, the
court reviewed the period prior to December 15 in assessing the "avail-
able supply" but, as in Cargill, concentrated mainly on the cash supply
on and after December 15, when the respondent's control "manifested
itself most emphatically.7 6 In G.H. Miller & Co., the court reviewed the
Id. at 1159.
6' Id. at 1158.
7o See text accompanying notes 46-52 supra.
7' 452 F.2d at 1164-67.
72 Id. at 1159.
7' Id. at 1161.
7' Id. at 1166.
' 201 F.2d at 481-82.
7 Id. at 480.
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"available supply" from December 16, 1952 through the end of that
month." Since the futures price manipulation was alleged to have occur-
red on December 22 and 23, with a cash market manipulation occurring
thereafter, the court clearly assessed the "available supply" both prior
to and at the time of the claimed violations. 8 It should be noted,
however, that the respondent's ownership of refrigerator eggs in
Chicago on December 16 was a modest 19.5 percent of the "available
supply" but increased to 72.1 percent on December 23 and 98.7 percent
on the last day of December.79 The latter dates, clearly, were given more
attention by the court in its review of the merits of the case. In General
Foods Corp., where the May 1944 rye futures contract was the focus of
inquiry, the court reviewed the "available supply" at various times dur-
ing the month of May, but principally on May 13, 1944 when, according to
the government, the respondents took affirmative steps to prevent cash
rye from entering the futures market." It is interesting to observe that
the General Foods court considered not only the supply of cash rye in
deliverable position in Chicago but also the existence of substantial
quantities of additional rye in Minneapolis, Duluth, Kansas City and
Milwaukee." The court's inference was that these out-of-town stocks
could be deemed available to "shorts" at some time during May.
Specifically, the court cited these additional stocks of cash rye in answer
to the government's claim that the respondents had manipulated the
market by acquiring large amounts of cash rye in Winnepeg and by at-
tempting other measures to prevent Canadian rye from becoming eligi-
ble for delivery on the May futures contract." And, in Peto v. Howell,
the court focused mainly on the last day of July, 1931 when it was alleg-
ed that the defendant, through the systematic taking of deliveries on the
July 1931 corn futures contract, had acquired the entire Chicago supply
of cash corn and offered that corn to the remaining "shorts" at excessive
prices.83
In another decision, Indiana Farm Bureau Cooperative Ass n, a
manipulation of the July 1973 corn futures contract was alleged. The Ad-
ministrative Law Judge (the ALJ), in his initial decision, focused
primarily on the date of the alleged manipulation-July 20-and the re-
mainder of the month in defining "available supply."" While the govern-
ment's calculation of "available supply" on July 20 was only 511,000
bushels of corn, the ALJ decided that the proper figure on that date
" 260 F.2d at 289.
78 Id.
79 Id.
" 170 F.2d at 229.
Id. at 228.
'8 Id. at 227-28.
101 F.2d at 356.
" [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,964 (1979).
Id. at 23,861-62.
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should be 4,206,000-which excluded the respondent's holdings-plus
410,000 bushels reaching Chicago between July 20 and August 1, 1973.86
In doing so, the ALJ included all reported deliverable stock on July 20
that the government had failed to show were firmly committed to other
purposes, as well as 340,000 bushels of higher priced "waxy maize."87 The
facts of the case indicate that available supplies of cash corn prior to
July 20 were not viewed as sufficient to satisfy all "shorts" wishing to
deliver on the July futures contract and, accordingly, the ALJ did not
look to that earlier period for signs of irresponsible action by "shorts" in
failing to procure supplies in a timely manner.88 However, the ALJ was
highly critical of the "shorts" for maintaining large positions in July corn
into the final trading day "even though they had no delivery capability."89
It should also be noted that the ALJ in Indiana Farm Bureau stated
that his calculation of "available supply" was a "minimal figure," and im-
plied that it would have been proper to also include two other sources of
supply: (1) the substantial amount of corn in delivery facilities that had
not been graded as of July 20 and thus was not publicly reported as
"deliverable," and (2) graded corn located at unapproved storage
facilities in Chicago that might have been transferred to authorized
delivery elevators." The government had argued that, as of July 20, the
ungraded corn could not be qualfied in time for delivery in the remaining
days of the month, an assertion that the ALJ did not expressly reject. 1
Had the ALJ included these stocks in his calculation of "available supp-
ly," the issue would have been squarely presented-as in Vol-
kart-whether the "shorts" had a duty, prior to July 20, to undertake
the grading of those stocks in preparation for delivery. Similarly, it was
uncontested that the transfer of graded corn from unapproved elevators
to authorized delivery facilities would involve an expense to the "shorts"
of from 14 to 18 cents per bushel 2 and, had the ALJ incorporated this
corn in his calculation of "available supply," it would have raised square-
ly the question of "economic impediment." Having chosen to exclude
these stocks and to adopt instead a "minimal figure," the ALJ avoided
these issues. But the fact that he implied that their inclusion might have
been permissible suggests that the "shorts'" duty to prepare, and the
obligation to deliver despite higher cost-also indicated by the ALJ's in-
clusion of higher-priced waxy maize in his "minimal figure" -would have
been affirmed.









Cotton Co.,9 3 the Commision exonerated the respondent of charges of
having manipulated downward the price of December 1971 cotton
futures contracts on the New York Cotton Exchange. The manipulation
was alleged to have occured on November 23, 1971, the first day when
delivery notices could be tendered by "shorts" on the December con-
tract. 4 The Commission focused upon November 22 in its assessment of
Hohenberg's cash cotton inventory, and found that the respondent then
owned 48,000 bales of certificated cotton." Total certificated cotton at
about that time was 83,299 bales. 6 The Commission, however, did not
make a detailed analysis of "available supply," although it appears to
have excluded all uncertificated cotton in describing the respondent's
relative ownership of cash cotton. In Hohenberg Brothers, such an
analysis may have been unnecessary since the allegation was that the
respondent had depressed cotton futures prices by the sudden delivery
of 37,500 bales on November 23, an effect that would not necessarily de-
pend upon ownership of any substantial portion of the "available supply"
as long as the delivered quantity was sufficient to produce the desired
price effect.
To summarize, the calculation of "available supply" is undertaken, at
least in "long" manipulation cases, as part of a determination whether
the accused had the ability to control the supply-and therefore direc-
tion or extent of prices-for the underlying cash commodity. Under the
"economic impediment" theory, supplies of the cash commodity that are
significantly more expensive to deliver than local stocks of "par" grade,
such as higher priced "premium" grades or distant supplies with signifi-
cant additional expenses associated with achieving delivery, may be ex-
cluded from the "available supply." On the other hand, where stocks
exist that .can be made deliverable inexpensively, they may be included
in the "available supply." The calculation is usually made at or about the
date of the alleged manipulation and generally attempts to identify the
stocks available to the "shorts" for delivery on that date and during the
remainder of the delivery period. Occasionally, when it is shown that
"shorts" have been dilatory in arranging for supplies to meet their
delivery obligations, and especially when those arrangements would not
have entailed significant additional expense, the court may include in
"available supply" those stocks existing prior to the date of the alleged
manipulation that could have been acquired by the "shorts" except for
their own fault, even though those stocks were no longer available to
" [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Comm. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,146 (1976), aff'd, [1975-1977
Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 120,271 (1977).




" Id. at 20,944.
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them when the alleged manipulation occurred. The objective of the
courts, it would appear, is to strike a balance between the obligation of
"longs" to avoid manipulation and the duty of "shorts" to act responsibly
in a delivery month. Shorts are not to be forced to acquire substantially
more expensive stocks, as compared to local prices, since the result is to
condone a local price manipulation upward to the value of those stocks.
On the other hand, shorts will not be heard to complain when their in-
ability to deliver local stocks-resulting in higher "offset" prices-is due
to their own refusal to make adequate preparations. The two objectives
need not be in conflict, although the Cargill and Volkart decisions are
often so portrayed, but can be harmonized through close and careful
analysis of the facts of each case.
C. "Dominant" Control of Cash Supplies
Having defined "available supply" of the underlying cash commodity
in a particular case, it remains to determine whether the accused's con-
trol of cash stock was sufficient to preclude the "shorts" from fulfilling
their contracts except by either purchasing inventory from the accused
or offsetting with him in the futures market. As the Cargill court cor-
rectly observed, no true economic power can be exerted by a person who
lacks control of some part of the cash supply needed by "shorts" for
delivery:
Obviously, if there were adequate supplies of deliverable grade
wheat available to the shorts [other than from Cargill] to deliver
to the longs on the future, Cargill would not be able to exact arti-
ficial prices in settlement of its contracts, for rather than paying
those prices, shorts would instead procure the wheat and deliver
it.9
The one exception to this rule, of course, is when a natural shortage of
the cash commodity exists and, for that reason, the long need not acquire
cash stocks in order to preclude the shorts from delivering. The
economic effect, called a "squeeze," is the same, however, as if the long
had in fact removed those stocks from circulation.
Perhaps the most stunning example of control of a cash supply is
Peto v. Howell, where the defendant, through deliveries on the July
1931 corn futures contract, had acquired 97 percent of all deliverable
corn in Chicago and 90 percent of the nationwide visible supply of corn,
leaving shorts with 1,500,000 bushels of July corn futures and nowhere
to turn except to the defendant."' In General Foods Corp. v. Brannan,
the analysis of cash control is less precise but indicates that all of the
named respondents collectively controlled over 10,000,000 bushels of
452 F.2d at 1164-65.
o 101 F.2d at 366.
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rye."1 For other reasons, including the court's refusal to treat the posi-
tions of all respondents as one, the manipulation charge was dismissed."2
The court did note, however, that "it is clearly shown that there was no
demand for rye in Chicago which could not be readily met from the supp-
ly there available."'0 3 In Great Western Food Distributors, Inc. v. Bran-
nan, a control of cash eggs was established from evidence that the
respondent embarked in December of 1947 on a program of accumulating
cash eggs and eventually held 51 percent of all stocks in Chicago. 10 The
appellate decision in G.H. Miller & Co. v. United States did not identify
the respondents' percentage ownership of cash eggs in December of 1952
but described a systematic accumulation of those stocks through the tak-
ing of delivery until they held the "major portion" of deliverable eggs.
105
In Volkart Brothers, Inc. v. Freeman, it was conceded that Volkart held
a dominant "long" futures position, but it did not appear that the respon-
dent controlled the cash supply of cotton.' In fact, the Cargill decision
expressly cited Volkart's lack of cash control as a distinguishing feature
of the Volkart ruling."7 By contrast, in Cargill, the court found that soft
red winter wheat was scarce at the time of the alleged manipulation but
that Cargill owned on May 20, 1963 all of the deliverable supply and, on
May 21, owned 50,000 of the total 70,000 bushels of deliverable wheat in
Chicago."' In Hohenberg Brothers, the respondent owned about 48,000
bales out of a total of 83,299 certificated bales of cotton, or about 58 per-
cent, but the ALJ in his initial decision had found that there were
8,000,000 bales of ginned cotton that could have been certified or other-
wise qualified for delivery as of November 22, 1971, the day preceding
the alleged "short" manipulation."' And, in Indiana Farm Bureau
Cooperative Ass n, the respondents owned only 228,000 bushels of corn
on the date of the alleged manipulation, while the ALJ calculated as a
"minimal figure" that the total "available supply" at that time was at
least 4,616,000 bushels."'
The fundamental question in assessing whether the "available sup-
ply" is controlled or dominated by the "long" is whether, after identify-
ing all supplies available from other sources, the "shorts" would still
need the "long's" inventory if they wished to make delivery. If so, the
"long" is in a position to frustrate those delivery needs or to exact a
higher price for the needed inventory. This is true unless, as explained
101 See 170 F.2d at 222.
1 Id. at 231.
103 Id. at 228.
1 201 F.2d at 481.
103 260 F.2d at 288-90.
1 See 311 F.2d at 56-57.
1 452 F.2d at 1172 n.15.
0 Id. at 1160.
[1975-1977 Transfer Binder] CoMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 120,146, at 20,946.
[1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 120,964, at 23,862.
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in the next subsection, the "shorts" have an opportunity to offset their
positions in the market with "longs" other than the suspected manipula-
tor. Accordingly, it is necessary to determine whether the accused has
also foreclosed that option to "shorts" in the futures market.
D. Dominant Futures Position
While the Commission has enforcement authority under the Act
with respect to pure cash market manipulations and corners,1" its prin-
cipal orientation is toward manipulations affecting futures prices, in
which cash market activity will often play an important role. Thus, the
typical manipulation inquiry will review not only the accused's control of
cash commodity supplies, but also that person's position at the time in
the futures market.
While the Commission has held that a dominant position in the
market is not essential to a manipulation or attempted manipulation,"2
that view appears to be intended merely to recognize that market prices
can be influenced without entering the market, such as by false rumors
and reports that precipitate a price reaction. Domination of the futures
market has always been required, however, in cases where the accused
has influenced prices through his trading activity.
In Peto v. Howell, the relative size of the defendant's position in
July 1931 corn futures on the Chicago Board of Trade in comparison with
total open interest in that contract is not disclosed, but his long position
of 8,500,000 bushels of futures was inferred to be a very substantial part
of the open interest during the delivery month."3 In General Foods Corp.
v. Brannan, the principal respondent was exonerated when the evidence
showed that, despite substantial cash holdings in rye, he had not accu-
mulated a dominant "long" position in May 1944 rye futures and, indeed,
had reduced his "long" position over the preceding months from a high
of 1,490,000 bushels to only 360,000 bushels.1 A better case study is
Great Western Food Distributors, Inc. v. Brannan, where the evidence
showed a steady rise in the respondent's percentage of the open interest
in December 1947 egg futures contracts from 33 percent of the "long"
open interest on December 1 to as high as 76 percent of all "long"
December futures contracts."' During the final week of futures trading,
. See, e.g., § 6(b) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 9 (1976), which authorizes the Commission to in-
stitute administrative action against any person, other than a contract market, "manipulat-
ing or attempting to manipulate or [who] has manipulated or attempted to manipulate the
market price of any commodity, in interstate commerce, or for future delivery ... " Id. (em-
phasis added).
" Hohenberg Brothers Cotton Co., [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP.
(CCH) 120,271, at 21,477.
1' 101 F.2d at 355.
.. 170 F.2d at 226.
115 201 F.2d at 480.
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Great Western's percentage of the "long" open interest ranged from 60
percent to 75 percent, a sufficient interest for the court to conclude that
its position in the market was dominant."' The court also made a prac-
tical assessment of the effect of this dominance upon "shorts," and
calculated that, from December 15 forward, one-third and eventually
one-half of all remaining "shorts" were required to turn to Great
Western to satisfy their obligations, even after calculating the supplies
of cash eggs-other than respondent's-that could have been used by
"shorts" for delivery. 117 In G.H. Miller & Co. v. United States, the
evidence showed that the respondents accumulated December 1952 egg
futures contracts during the month of December so that they held
roughly 14 percent of the "long" open interest on December 16, 78 per-
cent on December 19, and 100 percent on December 22 and 23, the days
when allegedly artificial prices for the contract occurred. " 8 Since the
court had upheld a finding that the respondents had the "major portion"
of cash eggs available for delivery, it is clear that, on the final days of
trading when they also had virtually all of the "long" open interest as
well, many of the "shorts" were required to settle their contracts with
the respondents. "9 In Volkart Brothers, Inc. v. Freeman, the respondent
on the date in question-October 15, 1957-had 12,100 bales of "long"
October cotton futures on the New York and New Orleans exchanges,
out of a total "long" open interest of 13,400 bales, or roughly 90
percent."' Volkart itself conceded that this futures position was domi-
nant, but was successful in persuading the court that cash supplies of
cotton could have been available to "shorts," had they used due diligence
in delivery preparations, which would have freed them from the need to
resort to Volkart to satisfy their contracts."' Thus, the "long" position,
though clearly dominant, did not place Volkart in control of futures
prices except for the additional factor of the "shorts'" irresponsible con-
duct in the face of readily obtainable cash cotton that they neglected to
secure. Finally, in Cargill Inc. v. Hardin, the manipulation of the May
1963 wheat futures contract was alleged to have occurred during the
final fifteen minutes of trading on May 21, 1963, and the court looked to
that short time period in assessing Cargill's "long" position in the
market." The court found that, in that period, Cargill held 62 percent of
the "long" open interest and concluded that such a percentage establish-
ed "dominance" over the remaining "shorts" in the market.", That
percentage consisted of wheat futures totalling 1,990,000 bushels, includ-
11l Id.
11 Id. at 481-82.
II 260 F.2d at 289.
I Id. at 289-90.
"' 311 F.2d at 56.
... Id. at 57; see text accompanying notes 59-65 supra.
452 F.2d at 1164; see id. at 1160.
' Id. at 1164.
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ing an additional 100,000 bushels acquired by Cargill on that same day."4
Moreover, the court found that available cash supplies of deliverable
wheat at that time, in hands other than Cargill's, amounted to only
20,000 bushels. 5 Since this scarcity of cash wheat effectively foreclosed
"shorts" from the alternative of delivery, the court found that Cargill's
dominant futures position required "shorts" to deal with Cargill as the
only means of satisfying their open contracts."6
E. The Combined "Dominance"
As the foregoing analyses show, the inquiry of a court in assessing
the ability of a person to control market prices must always take into ac-
count that there are two ways to satisfy futures obligations-by offset
in the futures market, or by delivery-and that no one has the true abil-
ity to control prices if other market participants can bypass his demands
and extinguish their obligations elsewhere. Accordingly, the aspiring
manipulator might foreclose all avenues of settlement except through
him.
The plan can be achieved by actual control of both the supply of the
commodity and the futures market open interest, as in Great Western
Food Distributors,"7 or by simply controlling the "long" open interest if
a natural shortage of cash supplies exists, as in Cargill."' It has been
suggested that the proper appraisal of manipulative ability is to view
both cash and futures activity in combination, rather than separately,
since the ultimate issue as to ability is whether the "shorts" have any
recourse for fulfilling their obligations except through the suspected
manipulator."9
IV. Price Artificiality
Having the ability to create artificial prices is of legal significance in
finding an actual manipulation only if it results in the creation of artifi-
cial prices."' Thus, even after the ability issue has been resolved against
the accused, it is necessary to make a largely economic analysis of
whether the futures or cash commodity over which the accused has
dominance reached artificial prices at that time.
It must be noted, first, that the futures market is very often a much
more competitive market than the corresponding cash market in the
"' Id. at 1160.
125 Id.
128 Id. at 1167.
12 See text accompanying notes 115-17 supra.
12 See text accompanying notes 122-26 supra.
' 1 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIEs FRAUD § 4.6, at
82,330.
1" Of course, an attempted manipulation-one that fails-is also unlawful. See text ac-
companying notes 29-30 supra.
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same commodity. Sales in the cash market can be sporadic. Transactions
between cash merchants can involve nonprice considerations, such as
pre-existing commercial relationships or the desire to establish new
business relationships. Prices in the cash market may tend to reflect uni-
que conditions, such as a sudden need for the commodity on the part of a
particular buyer that is not generally applicable to the trade as a whole.
Moreover, actual details of many cash transactions are not publicly
known where merchants prefer privacy in their dealings. As a result of
these factors and many others, the futures markets will frequently be
the best available barometer of prices for a particular commodity.
Even when dysfunctions occur in the futures markets, therefore, it
is by no means clear that they become less reliable than the cash
markets as a source of price information. It may be that, in some in-
stances, the futures market remains the better guide despite imperfec-
tions, or that a futures market at its worst is not appreciably less
reliable than resort to cash market prices."' Therefore, when asking
whether the futures price is "artificial," the question must also include
the issue "as compared to what?" And the external reference point iden-
tified in answer to that question should have to be shown to be a reliable
source of accurate and relevant prices. Futures prices ought not to be
compared for this purpose against "nominal" cash quotations, or against
actual sales having features foreign to the dynamics of a futures
market.3 '
In addition, it must be recognized that futures markets, which seek
to record the price impact of world-wide economic developments during
most of a futures contract's life, shrink into largely "local" markets dur-
ing delivery months. These markets become cash delivery vehicles dur-
ing the expiring month and, quite properly, are influenced at the time
mainly by the economic conditions prevailing at the delivery locations.
To say, then, that an expiring soybean futures contract in Chicago
should continue to reflect international economic conditions or world
prices is to ignore reality.
"' For instance, the stresses felt in the futures market during a period of natural
"squeeze" may be no more than the pressures felt among cash merchants and their
customers at the same time. A natural "squeeze"-a shortage of cash supplies-creates ad-
vantages for cash merchants as well and, where cash commodity has been pre-sold before its
acquisition, the seller in the cash market is in much the same position as the short in the
futures market. If the inventory is already owned, on the other hand, the seller has great
leverage over the buyer. Moreover, it is beyond question that the bargaining power among
cash merchants is far from equal, such as in the case of sales by farmers or small elevators
to giant exporting companies. It may well be, as a result of these factors, that the cash
market is more susceptible, more frequently, to stress than the futures market. To
presume, therefore, that cash market prices are a reliable gauge of value when the futures
market is in turmoil may be more a declaration of faith than a statement of reality.
"3 Examples of sales having features foreign to the dynamics of a futures market in-
clude a "distress" sale, an accommodation transaction, and a sale involving unusual location,
grade, transportation or other terms.
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Finally, when seasonal commodities such as grains are the subject of
futures trading, there is a natural and virtually inevitable shrinkage of
cash supply as the "crop year" approaches its end and before the next
harvest occurs. Cash prices tend to reflect and react to a growing scar-
city of cash supply and to the imminent arrival of a new harvest until,
near the end of the crop year, cash transactions can take on somewhat
unique characteristics. As supplies are approaching exhaustion, for ex-
ample, sales may be consummated as a "hording" strategy or as "panic"
buying. Or, if a surplus of "old" crop stocks is foreseen at the end of the
crop year, owners may dump their inventories in distress-type sales,
recognizing that the "new" crop will be preferred by buyers over the
previous year's supply. Care and caution are required, therefore, in mak-
ing comparisons between futures prices and the stressful environment
in which sales of cash commodities may occur near the end of a crop
year.
The importance of offering proof of price artificiality in a manipula-
tion case is vividly illustrated by General Foods Corp. v. Brannan where
the government failed to present expert evidence or to otherwise
establish that the price of rye or rye futures was artificial.'33 The discus-
sion will return shortly to the General Foods decision to assess its ruling
that a price that has been "stabilized" by action of "longs" is not an arti-
ficial price."'
A. Comparison of Contract Prices with Later Value
Artificial prices are generally related to other presumably mean-
ingful prices in the courts' analyses. They are also sometimes compared
with the price of the same commodity shortly after the alleged manipula-
tion has run its course. A good example of the latter analysis, sometimes
referred to as "burying the corpse, ' appears in Peto v. Howell, where
the court found that the defendant's actions had caused the price of July
1931 corn futures to rise 25-1/2 cents during the final three days of
futures trading and that, on August 1, the price of corn collapsed until,
by that month's end, it had dropped 40 percent from the price exacted by
the defendant."6 In Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin as well, the court cited
statistics showing that, following Cargill's May 21, 1963 trading which
realized prices up to $2.28 per bushel for May wheat futures, cash prices
were reported by month's end as low as $2.03-3/8 per bushel."7
133 170 F.2d at 223.
"' See text accompanying notes 172-74 infra.
'5 See text accompanying notes 212-15 infra.
' 101 F.2d at 356.
137 452 F.2d at 1168 n.13.
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B. Comparison with Supply-Demand Factors
The two principal cases containing "artificial price" analyses are
Great Western Food Distributors, Inc. v. Brannan and Cargill Inc. v.
Hardin. In Great Western, the government submitted evidence and ex-
pert testimony comparing the December 1947 egg futures and cash
prices with the actual supply and demand situation in Chicago at that
time, for the purpose of showing that the futures price was abnormally
high in light of those factors.138 The court, in this respect, differentiated
between what it called the "real" demand for cash eggs-ie., the com-
mercial demand-and the "technical" demand generated by "shorts"
needing to cover their obligation in the market.3 ' Implicitly, the court
seems to have viewed "short" demand for cash eggs as not part of the
bona fide supply/demand equation, a conclusion that would appear to
deny the economic interrelationship between the futures and cash mar-
kets. However, the court ultimately rejected the government's theory
for other reasons, principally that it had not supplied adequate price
data for earlier months that it sought to compare with December cash
market conditions and made no attempt to describe the similarities or
differences that might have existed in economic conditions during the
comparative periods. 4 ' Thus, the court refused to assume that different
months of the same futures contract are necessarily subject to identical
economic influences even if supply and demand are the same in those
periods.
C. Comparison of "Spread" Relationships
A second test utilized by the government in Great Western was to
compare the "spread" relationship between the December 1947 and
January 1948 egg futures contracts as compared to that relationship be-
tween December-January contracts in all but two of the preceding years
since 1932.41 While those statistics showed that -the current "spread"
had been more than three times greater than the average spread during
the earlier years, the court accepted this comparison as probative only
after it was satisfied that the previous period reflected "normal" prices,
taking into account such factors as the Depression and the intervention
of wartime price controls."' And a third test used successfully by the
government was to compare the historical comparative prices between
December egg futures and the price of fresh eggs, a premium grade of




." Id. at 482-83.
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eggs."' Using the period 1932-1947, the government showed that fresh
eggs commanded an average premium of four cents over December
futures in the period whereas, in 1947, the December futures had risen
to within 1/2 cent of fresh egg prices.4 The government also showed
that, in 1947, fresh egg prices had fallen in late December by about 7-1/2
cents per dozen while the December futures experienced no similar drop
in price and ended within 1/2 cent of fresh egg prices.'
In Cargill, the government employed similar tests of price artificia-
lity. Comparing May 1963 wheat futures prices with prices of May
futures in the preceding nine years, the government showed that the
rise in May 1963 prices of 18-5/8 cents during the final two trading days
had no precedent in the preceding nine years and, in fact, prices on those
days in ealier years declined more often than they rose.4 In addition,
the government compared the "spread" relationship between the May
1963 wheat futures contract and its July counterpart with spread rela-
tionships of those months in the preceding nine years.47 The statistics
showed that the 1963 spread of 18-5/8 cents was not found in any other
year and that, in fact, the spread had remained the same or declined in
seven of the nine years. '48 A further comparison was made between the
price of May 1963 soft wheat in Chicago and the price of the hard wheat
futures contract in Kansas City-the "inter-market spread"-as con-
trasted with the nine previous years, and showed that the May price in
Chicago was "considerably out of line" with Kansas City.'49
D. Comparison with Cash Prices
The government in Cargill sought to show that May wheat futures
were over-priced compared to the cash price of soft red winter wheat at
that time.' As noted earlier,"' this can be a precarious undertaking and,
in the court's words, evoked a "mass of conflicting evidence.""' The
court acknowledged "the difficulty of determining the cash price of
wheat, for actual cash trades on the Chicago spot market are relatively
infrequent and the prices of individual transactions may vary greatly
depending on the positions of the parties, the quantity involved, and the
time of the transaction.""' 3 The court might also have added, but did not,
the difficulty of discerning cash prices for wheat in May of any year,
" Id. at 483.
144 Id.
145 Id.




"' Id. at 1168.
,' See text accompanying notes 130-34 supra.




since that is usually the dying month of "old crop" wheat. The govern-
ment's evidence consisted of official government price reports for wheat,
which contained cash prices lower than the May futures, and both
government and private reports showing that cash prices for soft wheat
fell "rather sharply" after the close of the May contract.' Other
evidence proferred by the government was a large sale of cash wheat by
Cargill itself, several days before the alleged manipulation, at prices
well below the ultimate May futures price, and Cargill's later disposition
of wheat after trading ceased at prices "substantially below" the criti-
cized May futures price. 5 ' The government also cited an incident follow-
ing the close of futures trading when a wheat warehouse receipt origin-
ally bought from Cargill at $2.28-1/4 per bushel would not be bought back
by Cargill and the owner had to sell at the receipt for $2.18 to a "short"
after being offered as low as $2.05 by milling companies.'56 Finally, the
government introduced an "analytical study" of a USDA expert purport-
ing to establish the "average economic value" of soft red winter wheat at
Chicago during May 1963, which concluded that this "economic value"
was within a range of $2.10 and $2.17 per bushel."5 7 Cargill, for its part,
countered with a private price reporting service showing that cash
wheat and futures prices were in harmony, and with the expert testi-
mony of both economists and trade witnesses, to the same effect.'58
Cargill also noted that it had made actual cash sales at $2.28 on May 20
and 21.11 Cargill's efforts were to no avail, however."5 Finally, the
evidence offered in Indiana Farm Bureau Cooperative Ass'n to show
price artificiality was similar to the data presented in Cargill, but with
less emphasis on historical averages. The Division of Enforcement show-
ed that Indiana Farm's prices of $3.70 to $3.90 per bushel for July 1973
corn futures on the final day of trading in that contract represented a
one-day price rise of at least a dollar more than had been recorded on the
final day of July trading during the period 1963-1976, and about a dollar
wider spread between July and September futures than had been
recorded in that period.6 It was also shown that cash sales, including
the respondent's, did not exceed $2.88 per bushel in July except for a
cash price quoted by the Commodity Credit Corporation after the
futures contract had expired.'62 The ALJ accepted certain cash prices
above that level but nevertheless held that Indiana Farm's prices on
July 20 were artificially high.6 ' The charge against the respondent was
154 Id.
"~Id.
' Id. at 1168-69.
... Id. at 1168.
" Id. at 1169.
159 Id.
155 Id.
"' [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,964, at 23,858.
1e2 Id.
" Id. at 23,859.
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dismissed, however, for lack of intent to manipulate the July futures
price."4
E. Critique of Price Artificiality Analyses
The author does not profess to be skilled in the art or science of
economics, and issues of "price artificiality" are most assuredly the pro-
vince of economists. It does appear from the cases, however, that the
evidence usually offered on the question is the source of as many ques-
tions as answers. Reliance upon reported cash prices is warranted only if
those figures are reliable, and often they are not. The use of "averages,"
especially over many years, denies the uniqueness of each incorporated
and homogenized figure. It seems fair to say that no two futures con-
tracts behave identically, and even when similar features exist, they
may be occasioned by quite different market conditions or judgments.
Averaging masks those differences and creates a false sense of "normal-
ity" among events that may be far from normal either standing alone or
when compared with the other grouped events. By the same token, theo-
retical economic "models" that attempt to show what "should have
been" are more reliable in the theoretician's office than in the rough-and-
tumble market where traders with "systems" are quickly and painfully
dispossessed of their confidence. And, it bears repeating that the
sometimes obscured and frequently incomplete cash market data offered
in manipulation cases may not be any more reliable than even imperfect
futures prices in a court's quest to determine what is normal and what is
artificial.
F. "Abnormal" Commodity Routing
Artificiality has sometimes also been related to what is referred to
as "abnormal" movement of the commodity in commerce. It will be
recalled that section 5a(10) of the Act"6 5 authorizes the Commission to
order a contract market to adopt specific delivery locations or price dif-
ferential for the purpose, among others, of preventing "the abnormal
movement of such commodity in interstate commerce." Manipulation
cases sometimes cite the actual or potential rerouting of commodities
out of normal channels and into the futures market as a sign of "artifi-
cial" prices at the delivery location. In Cargill, the point was made suc-
cinctly:
[W]e have been shown no good reason why the futures price
should reflect the cost of bringing in a higher price and grade of
wheat for which there is no demand in the local area. It is this
price which was artificially high and therefore useless to the
trade and nation. 6
" Id. at 23,872.
" 7 U.S.C. § 7a(10) (1976); see text accompanying note 12 supra.
452 F.2d at 1173.
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Similarly, in Peto v. Howell, the court noted that the defendant's spec-
tacular corner of corn on a virtually nationwide basis disrupted the nor-
mal flow of commerce: "The proof was that this corn would normally go
to other markets but, because of the tightness of the market brought
about by defendant, came to Chicago. This diversion was clearly an in-
terference with the current of interstate commerce .... 167
These comments seem to adopt the view in Great Western Food
Distributors that the needs of "shorts" for the cash commodity to fulfill
their delivery obligation are not part of the legitimate demand for that
commodity in the local market.'68 Such a premise, as noted earlier,
divorces deliveries on futures contracts from other transactions in the
cash market, even though they are the same in every economic sense.'69
The view seems, instead, to reflect a nearly moral statement that the
movement of a commodity into position for delivery is somehow -wrong,
despite the clearly lawful existence of a contract contemplating it, unless
the commodity is thereafter consumed or commercially marketed locally.
Section 3 of the Act 7 ' recites that the futures market affects interstate
commerce, to be regulated as such, and that fact has been vigorously af-
firmed in Peto v. Howell.' It is therefore troublesome to conclude that
cash commodities, moving into the part of commerce known as the fu-
tures market, have been diverted in some manner from commerce. It
may well be that the flow of commodities, originally destined to another
location, into the futures market to realize a higher price is inefficient
from a marketing-but not an economic-viewpoint since the commo-
dity may then have to be rerouted a second time to its original commer-
cial destination. But there appears to be no other segment of American
commerce where a businessman's decision to seek the best price is
criticized in this fashion, and a survey of product marketing would likely
show many instances of similar "diversion" of goods and articles that the
law does not attempt to prevent. It also bears mention that the "diver-
sion" objection to maintaining adequate supplies for future delivery at
the delivery location would, if sustained, aggravate rather than relieve
market congestion.
G. Stabilizing Prices
Before concluding the discussion of price artificiality, it is necessary
to highlight the ruling of General Foods Corp. v. Brannan that a price
that is "stabilized" so as not to decline is not artificial if the price was
l,7 101 F.2d at 359.
l In Great Western, the Seventh Circuit found that "[a]dditional proof submitted tend-
ed to establish that the real demand, as opposed to technical demand created by a cornering
operation, was lower in December 1947 than in the previously mentioned months." 201 F.2d
at 482.
1.. See text accompanying notes 115-17 supra.
0 7 U.S.C. § 5 (1976).
. 101 F.2d at 357-60. See also Board of Trade of Chicago v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1 (1923).
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originally reached through the operation of natural forces." 2 In General
Foods, it was alleged that the respondents sought to prevent an ex-
pected decline in May 1944 rye futures prices due to the imminent sale
of 2,000,000 bushels in the market by arranging to have the position
transferred to a company that would withhold it from the market."3
Since planned action designed to control prices by preventing their
movement tampers with normal market forces as surely as a scheme to
raise or lower prices, this part of the General Foods decision is subject
to criticism and may not be reliable precedent in future cases. 74
V. Causation
Once it has been established that the accused manipulator had the
economic power-the ability-to influence prices and that prices in the
pertinent period were "artificial," the two must be connected to show
that the accused's actions were the cause of the price aberration. If the
artificial price resulted from other factors, of course, the accused has
manipulated nothing. The causality link was expressly addressed in
Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin where, after finding that May 1963 wheat futures
prices were artificial, the court observed that "[t]he question now is
whether the artificially high price was caused by Cargill."'75 The court
relied heavily on the market pattern for the May contract, noting that
the growing scarcity of wheat in Chicago-caused in part by Cargill's
own sales for export-could account for the rise in prices for the May
contract on May 20, 1963, when news of the export sale became wide-
spread.'78 But the court perceived that, on May 21, "the market was re-
sistant to any further increase in the price" of May wheat futures, and
rose only 1-1/2 cents above the May 20 closing price until the final fifteen
minutes of trading. 7 During that fifteen minute period, Cargill entered
step-up orders to sell approximately 2,000,000 bushels of "long" May
futures at prices seven and eight cents higher than the current market
quotation.'78 And, while two other commercial firms made trades in that
period at similarly high prices, the quantities involved were relatively
small compared to Cargill's orders and neither of the two commercials
had withheld their entire position, as Cargill did, until the final fifteen
minutes of trading.7 '
... 170 F.2d at 230-31.
' Id. at 222.
... Indeed, the Commission has signalled its intention to view price stabilization as a
form of unlawful manipulation. See Hohenberg Brothers Cotton Co., [1975-1977 Transfer
Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,271, at 21,478.
' 452 F.2d at 1169.
178 Id.
177 Id.
"' Id. at 1169-70.
17' Id. at 1170.
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While most of the other manipulation cases do not expressly isolate
causation as a separate element for proof, the importance of this issue is
illustrated by Volkart Brothers, Inc. v. Freeman and Indiana Farm
Bureau Cooperative Ass'n. In Volkart, the court did not make an express
finding whether the price of the October 1957 cotton futures contracts
reached artificial levels. Nevertheless, it decided that, even if artificial
prices had occurred, the true "cause" was not Volkart's actions but the
shortage of certificated cotton brought about by the shorts' irresponsible
failure to take steps to certificate other easily available cotton for
delivery."' Similarly, in Indiana Farm Bureau, the Commission's ALJ
discussed causation specifically and refused to blame the respondent for
a large rise in prices on the final trading day of the July 1973 corn
futures contract, citing huge "shorts" positions of other traders that
were carried into the final trading day when there was neither a desire
nor ability on their part to make delivery.'' The decision did not turn en-
tirely on this point, but it is manifest that the ALJ was influenced by
what was described at trial as the shorts' "irresponsible" and "impru-
dent" conduct.'8 '
VI. The "Intent" to Manipulate
Absent proof that the accused actually intended to bring about arti-
ficial prices by means of his economic power, no manipulation finding can
be made. In Great Western Food Distributors, Inc. v. Brannan, the
court stated: "the intent of the parties during their trading is a deter-
minative element of a punishable corner. Unintentional corners can
develop . . . and should not carry the pain of forfeiture of trading
privileges."'83 And, again in Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, the court acknowledg-
ed that "[m]any squeezes do not involve intentional manipulation of
futures prices, but are caused by various natural market forces, such as
unusual weather conditions which have caused abnormally low crop pro-
duction or inadvertent destruction of a substantial volume of the com-
modity itself.""'8 The Cargill decision thus stated the issue succinctly:
"The aim must be therefore to discover whether conduct has been inten-
tionally engaged in which has resulted in a price which does not reflect
basic forces of supply and demand."' 8
' 311 F.2d at 59-60.
"' [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] CoMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 120,964, at 23,864-65.
,8' See id. at 23,865.
" 201 F.2d at 479.
"u 452 F.2d at 1162.
' Id. at 1163. The Cargill court's phraseology, however, has caused a great deal of con-
fusion regarding whether the accused must specifically intend to create artificial prices or,
rather, must simply intend to engage in conduct that leads to artificial prices. See text ac-
companying notes 191-97 infra.
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A. Direct or Circumstantial Evidence of Intent
Proof of intent must often be based upon circumstantial evidence
rather than direct evidence. As the court observed in G.H. Miller & Co.
v. United States:
We are fully cognizant of the fact that corners can uninten-
tionally develop and that it is almost impossible to prove by di-
rect evidence that the acts and transactions of the petitioners
were undertaken pursuant to an understanding or agreement to
act collectively and in a uniform manner. Proof of such concerted
action and the intent to so act must generally be circumstantial
unless one or more of the participants would- so admit.'86
While the circumstantial evidence utilized in key manipulation cases will
be summarized below,187 it should be noted that something very close to
"direct" evidence of manipulative intent appears in some of the cases. In
G.H. Miller & Co., for example, the court cited testimony in which the
principal respondent was quoted as having told one of the '"shorts" who
came to him for cash eggs in order to make delivery on the final day of
the delivery month: "Are you in this deal? Gee, I'm sorry you happen to
be in it."'88 And, in Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, an inter-office telegram was
produced showing that a Cargill employee, on May 6, 1963, had advised
his colleagues as follows: "Excellent wheat summary. Question is how
much wheat going to be available June 15 so we can figure old crop
needs and what it's going to cost our pals."'89 And, in Great Western
Food Distributors, Inc. v. Brannan, evidence was admitted by the
Judicial Officer that an official of Great Western had said to government
investigators that the company's actions in December 1947 egg futures
were designed and intended to raise December prices and thereby widen
the "spread" between the December and January egg futures while the
company held a "spread" position in those contracts.'' These types of
communications, of course, can be taken out of proper context, or can
easily be misconstrued. Nevertheless, these examples illustrate the fact
that, in providing manipulative intent, effort will be made to find such
materials to bolster more circumstantial proof.
B. Specific Intent v. Willfuzl Conduct Withiout Price Intent
It should be noted that some confusion has arisen on the issue of
manipulative intent by reason of a statement by the Commission in
Hohenberg Brothers. There, the Commission attem pted to paraphrase
"u 260 F.2d at 290.
1 See text accompanying notes 201-15 infra.
"u 260 F.2d at 289.
189.452 F.2d at 1171.
"1 201 F.2d at 484.
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the meaning of "manipulation" and, in one sentence, seemed to say that
manipulative intent is shown if the conduct is intentionally engaged in,
even if the resulting artificial price was not actually intended:
"manipulation has been defined generally as conduct intentionally
engaged in resulting in an artificial price, i.e., a price that does not
reflect the basic forces of supply and demand."1 9' But the Commission did
not stop there. Its paraphrase of the law continued: "A finding of
manipulation in violation of the Act requires a finding that the party
engaged in conduct with the intention of affecting the market price of a
commodity .... "' 92 Thus, a fair reading of the Commission's statements is
that the necessary intent must attach to the creation of artificial prices,
rather than simply to intentional trading that thereafter brought about
unintended artificial prices. In other words, the Commission's full state-
ment appears to mean that the manipulator must have a specific intent
to create artificial prices.
Nevertheless, the Commission's Division of Enforcement, relying on
the first above-quoted portion of the Commission's statement regarding
intent, urged the ALJ in Indiana Farm Bureau Cooperative Ass'n to
hold that intentional conduct leading to artificial prices, whether or not
artificial prices were intended, is sufficient to prove an unlawful
manipulation. ' The ALJ agreed to apply the Division's proposed stan-
dard:
While there is language in Hohenberg to support both standards,
it seems probable that the more general standard would be ap-
plied ... and no specific intent to effect an artificial price would
be required. This conclusion is supported by the assertion of the
Commission that a showing that questioned activity is "conso-
nant with prudent business practices" is not in itself sufficient to
refute an allegation of attempted manipulation.... It is believed
that a trader may be presumed to have foreseen the conse-
quences (artificial prices) of his conduct, and therefore to have
"intended" those consequences, even though his conduct was
commercially motivated .... In any event, an endeavor will be
made in the discussion that follows to apply that standard.' 94
Whether the ALJ's approach is adopted by the Commission remains to
be seen. In Hohenberg, it seems clear that the Commission intended only
to restate existing case law, and not to fashion a new definition. In any
event, the ALJ's ruling in Indiana Farm Bureau must be viewed in the
"' [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,271, at 21,477. See also
Cargill v. Hardin, 452 F.2d at 1163.
"1 [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] CoMm. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,271, at 21,477 (emphasis
added).
,.3 [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] CoMm. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,964, at 23,860.
194 Id.
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context that he was in the process of exonerating the respondent, and
the selection of the more liberal interpretation would have no effect on
the ultimate decisions."-' Moreover, the ALJ's position can fairly be read
to mean that a specific intent to create artificial prices must be proven
but can be inferred from conduct that can reasonably be foreseen to
cause artificial prices. In other words, conduct that can be expected to
generate artificial prices is indirect evidence of a specific intent to pro-
duce that result. Viewed in this fashion, the ruling in Indiana Farm
Bureau may simply add to the body of law, referenced above, that
specific intent to cause artificial prices may be established by cir-
cumstantial evidence. Nevertheless, the application of a concept of
"reasonable foreseeability" to manipulative intent, if viewed otherwise,
would emerge as a new formulation of the law, probably easing the
burden of proof in manipulation cases.
That the ALJ's holding in Indiana Farm Bureau on the issue of "in-
tent" may not necessarily be a departure from prior case law requiring
specific intent to affect prices can be shown to some extent by analysis
of those judicial decisions. In particular, Cargil4 Inc. v. Hardin begins
the inquiry into intent with the question, "Was the squeeze intentionally
caused by Cargill?", and follows immediately with this statement:
Cargill was no novice in futures trading and knew of market con-
ditions which could cause a squeeze .... In an interview with the
Department of Agriculture investigators, a Cargill executive
said ... that the sell order was not placed until the last minute
because he "waited and watched because he knew the market
was going up."'9
Thus, the court was impressed with Cargill's sophistication about the
markets, and unimpressed with the notion that, under prevailing condi-
tions, Cargill might not have realized the "bullish" effect of its late sell-
ing effort at scale-up prices. In sharp contrast, the ALJ in Indiana Farm
Bureau Cooperative Ass'n concluded that equally astute respondents
"could not reasonably have foreseen that [the proven artificial] prices
would be reached because of their activity.' 19 7 Accordingly, a concept of
"intent" based upon consideration of the sophistication of the accused
and the extent to which all circumstances, taken together and in context,
would compel such a person to expect his actions to provoke artificial
prices, may underpin both Indiana Farm Bureau and the principal case
law, and may constitute one of those indirect or circumstantial ways to
' In the same vein, the ALJ in Indiana Farm Bureau adopted for purposes of the case
a calculation of "deliverable supply" more favorable than necessary to the Division of En-
forcement. Id. at 23,862. Likewise, exhibits of the Division excluded at the hearing were ad-
mitted for purposes of the decision. Id. at 23,872.
19 452 F.2d at 1170-71.
1'T [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,964, at 23,872.
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establish a specific intent to create artificial prices. No tribunal, as yet,
has gone so far as to impute knowledge where none exists or to expli-
citly adopt a "should have known" standard for manipulative intent.
C. Profit and Intent
It appears to be well established that a manipulation is unlawful
even if no profit results therefrom, and, therefore, that lack of profit
does not prove lack of manipulative intent. In Cargill, the court made
this point clearly: "In such [a manipulation] inquiry, the question of
whether an alleged manipulator has made a profit is largely irrelevant,
for the economic harm done by manipulation is just as great whether
there has been a profit or a loss in the operation."'98 While the Commis-
sion adopted this view in Hohenberg Brothers'99 and the ALJ followed
that lead in Indiana Farm Bureau Cooperative Ass'n,0 ' the financial
motive of the accused was recognized to be relevant to the issue of intent
in both cases. Market conduct that would appear to be to the accused's
economic disadvantage would warrant a competency hearing far more
often than a charge of intentional market manipulation.
D. Use of "Step-Up" Orders
Almost invariably, the inferences and proof of manipulative intent
emerge from a full analysis of the circumstances of each individual case.
Each of the elements of a manipulation discussed above is examined in
the factual context of the particular proceeding, and often the court
deduces intent from the totality of those facts. Unlike the antitrust laws,
there appears to be no single act that constitutes "per se" manipulation,
but rather each case is examined in all of its pertinent details to deter-
mine whether the ability and intent to manipulate existed, and whether
they resulted in an artificial price. However, there are certain forms of
conduct that seem, at least superficially, to trigger special attention by a
reviewing court.
One such act is the entry into the market of "step-up" orders by a
person whose other actions have created a probability that prices will
rise. In Cargill Inc. v. Hardin, the court was clearly troubled by the fact
that Cargill, in the final fifteen minutes of trading in the May 1963 wheat
futures contract, and knowing of the severe scarcity of cash wheat that
was then available to "shorts" for delivery, entered step-up orders when
the price of futures was only $2.20, at the following levels:
200,000 bushels at $2.27
200,000 bushels at $2.27-1/4
300,000 bushels at $2.27-1/2
452 F.2d at 1163.
[1975-1977 Transfer Binder] CoMm. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 120,271, at 21,478.
[1977-1980 Transfer Binder] CoMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,964, at 23,870.
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400,000 bushels at $2.27-3/4
500,000 bushels at $2.28
390,000 bushels at $2.28-1/4201
Note that the lowest order was priced at seven cents over the then-
prevailing market price, and that the larger orders carried higher and
higher prices."2 The court stopped short of declaring that practice il-
legal, as such, but characterized it as "highly unusual market
behavior. '203
On the other hand, the ALJ in Indiana Farm Bureau Cooperative
Ass'n faced a similar series of orders to sell July 1973 corn futures con-
tracts during the final half hour of trading on the last day of the con-
tract, as follows:
100,000 bushels at $3.70
100,000 bushels at $3.75
100,000 bushels at $3.80
100,000 bushels at $3.85
90,000 bushels at $3.9020
4
At the time that these orders were placed, July corn futures were
trading at $3.70 per bushel and the higher prices in the orders had not
been reached during trading.205 The orders were filled in their entirety,
with one minor exception, at the prices sought.2 08 The ALJ refused to
view those orders as evidence of manipulative intent."7 His reasoning is
related to an assessment of the entire factual context of the case but, at
the risk of over-simplification, he appears to have concluded that the
Indiana Farm Bureau had a legitimate need for cash corn, could have
stood for delivery, and that the price of July futures would have risen in
that event as well:
The culpability of placing the five orders hinges on the legiti-
macy for respondents' taking delivery, for if they had stood for
delivery, the market, concededly, would have gone higher.
Therefore, these orders, having a reverse effect on the market
from taking delivery, cannot be deemed to be a greater offense.
Shorts made the decision to pay these prices to respondents and
to other longs rather than attempting to obtain corn for delivery.
In retrospect, that appears to have been a miscalculation, but it
is not proof of a manipulative intent of respondents at the time. 8
21 452 F.2d at 1160.
202 Id.
" Id. at 1170.
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In Indiana Farm Bureau, unlike Cargill, the step-up orders involved only
one-fifth of the respondent's open position in July corn.0 9 Delivery was
actually taken on the other four-fifths of the position, and at the highest
price of $3.80 per bushel."' The ALJ viewed these deliveries as confirma-
tion that cash corn was truly needed for commercial purposes by the
respondents and that, since "top dollar" was paid for cash corn, the only
profit realized by the respondents was on the step-up orders which con-
stituted only 20 percent of their total July position."'
Thus, it appears that "step-up" orders will attract the attention of
the reviewing tribunal in manipulation cases, but that they will not
necessarily lead to a finding of manipulative intent. In Cargill, virtually
all of its May 1963 wheat futures position wis offered in the market on a
step-up basis, while in Indiana Farm Bureau only a fraction of the total
position was offered in this fashion. It is difficult to assess whether that
fact, alone, accounts for the different results in the two cases, but it was
probably influential.
E. "Burying the Corpse"
The so-called "burying the corpse" feature-the question of whether
deliveries allegedly taken (or cash supplied withheld from the market) to
'"squeeze the shorts" are later disposed of at significantly lower prices
than were reached in the futures market-may be tangentially relevant
to manipulative intent as well as to price artificiality. In Cargill, for ex-
ample, the respondent received between $2.27 and $2.28-1/4 per bushel in
liquidating its May wheat futures positions and thereafter offered its
wheat warehouse receipts to remaining shorts for delivery purposes at a
high price of $2.28-1/4.22 However, between June 4 and June 13, it sold
"old crop" wheat in the cash market at prices ranging from $2.10 to $2.13
per bushel, or as much as 18 cents per bushel lower than the prices that
it had realized in the futures market and through deliveries by the
shorts during late May. 23 This development was not cited specifically by
the court as evidence of either manipulative intent or of price artificial-
ity."4 However, it would seem quite relevant to those issues that an ac-
cused manipulator, after insisting that the futures price 'Was not incon-
sistent with cash market prices, would accept a significantly lower price
for the same commodity shortly after the alleged manipulation has been
completed. Absent intervening market developments explaining why
lower prices were acceptable to the accused after the events in




212 452 F.2d at'1160-61.
2,3 Id. at 1161.
See id. at 1167-72.
211 It must be recognized in Cargill, of course, that the "old crop" wheat held by Cargill
1981]
762 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXVIII
the futures was based on a good faith belief that cash values were the
same might well be questioned.
VII. Definitions of Manipulation
A. Specific Judicial Definitions of Manipulation
As the foregoing sections indicate, proof of manipulation under the
Act entails an arduous examination of all of the facts surrounding the
events in question. Nevertheless, the courts have not been timid in at-
tempting, in a sentence or two, to capsulize this complex concept. Herein
are a few of those attempts.
In Peto v. Howell, suit was brought under the Sherman Act"6 rather
than under the Commodity Exchange Act for a manipulation of corn
futures and cash corn prices in July of 1931.17 The court of appeals
adopted the definition of a "corner" articulated in United States v. Pat-
ten,"8 an earlier antitrust case involving commodities.219 The court in
Peto stated:
[A] corner consists, broadly speaking, in acquiring control of all
of the dominant portion of a commodity with the purpose of arti-
ficially enhancing the price, one of the important features of
which is purchase for future delivery, coupled with a holding
from sale for a limited time.... [A] corner in the available supply
of a staple commodity ... normally a subject of trade and com-
merce among the states, and the consequent enhancement artifi-
cially of its price throughout the country and compelling all who
have occasion to obtain it to pay the enhanced price, or else to
leave their needs unsatisfied, is within the terms of [the Sher-
man Act].22
In General Foods Corp. v. Brannan, where the court reached the
fragile conclusion that preventing market prices from changing is not a
manipulation, the description of the attributes of a manipulation is
similarly unique: "[fjurthermore, the common criteria usual in manipula-
tion or corner cases are deceit, trickery through the spreading of false
rumors, concealment of position, the violation of express anti-
manipulation controls, or other forms of fraud."2 ' The analysis of
was increasingly influenced, as time went by, by the imminence of new crop wheat. In late
May, the arrival of new crop wheat was still some time away while, by mid-June, that was
no longer true.
2'8 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
' 101 F.2d at 354.
2,8 226 U.S. 525 (1913).
.. 101 F.2d at 357-58.
Id.
2 170 F.2d at 224.
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manipulation cases contained in previous sections of this Article seems
to demonstrate that, instead of "trickery" and "deceit," the proven
manipulators have relied upon the open and heavy-handed use of raw
economic power that the victims were all too painfully aware of. The
court's equation of manipulation with "deceit," therefore, is ques-
tionable.
In Great Western Food Distributors, Inc. v. Brannan, the court of-
fered the following definition of a "corner":
[A] corner is the executed plan of manipulation of prices of a
given commodity whereby a trader or group of traders gains
control of the supply or the future demand of a commodity and
requires the shorts to settle their obligations, either by the pur-
chase of deliverable quantities of the supply or offsetting long
contracts, at an arbitrary, abnormal and dictated price imposed
by the cornerer. This manipulation may be effected by creation
of an artificial demand through purchases of long contracts in ex-
cess of the known deliverable supply ... or by the purchase of all
of the available cash supply ... or by a combination of both... .22
This definition should not be read to mean that a large long position, or
control of the cash supply, in and of itself, will necessarily create the op-
portunity for price manipulation. The shorts must be effectively.
foreclosed from satisfying their obligations through both channels-off-
set of futures and cash delivery-except with the dominant long before
the requisite economic power to dictate prices will exist.
In Volkart Brothers, Inc. v. Freeman, the court quoted from
testimony given by an industry representative at a congressional hear-
ing as to the meaning of "manipulation":
Manipulation is, "any and every operation or transaction or prac-
tice ... calculated to produce a price distortion of any kind in any
market either in itself or in relation to other markets. If a firm is
engaged in manipulation it will be found using devices by which
the prices of contracts for some one month in some one market
may be higher than they would be if only the forces of supply
and demand were operative.... Any and every operation, trans-
action [or] device, employed to produce these abnormalities of
price relationship in the futures markets, is manipulation."2
The court in Volkart did not rest on the witness' personal definition but
elaborated upon it:
Certainly the term "manipulate" means more than the charging
of what some may consider to be unreasonably high prices.
201 F.2d at 478-79.
311 F.2d at 58.
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Otherwise, there would be grave doubts as to the constitutional-
ity of the statutes.... [T]here must be a purpose to create prices
not responsive to the forces of supply and demand; the conduct
must be "calculated to produce a price distortion." There may be
a squeeze not planned or intentionally brought about by the peti-
tioners. Such a squeeze should not result in their being
punished." 4
And to underscore the importance of intent and purpose, the court
reiterated that "it must appear not only that they profited 5 from a
squeeze, but that they intentionally brought about the squeeze by plan-
ned action." '228
In Cargil4 Inc. v. Hardin, the court observed that "[tihe methods and
techniques of manipulation are limited only by the ingenuity of man,"'
apparently meaning that manipulation can be triggered by a variety of
events such as false rumors intended to cause shock waves in the
market. But, with respect to a market manipulation brought about by
trader action, the court offered very precise definitions of both a "cor-
ner" and a "squeeze":
In its most extreme form, a corner amounts to nearly a monopoly
of a cash commodity, coupled with the ownership of long futures
contracts in excess of the amount of that commodity, so that
shorts-who because of the monopoly cannot obtain the cash
commodity to deliver on their contracts-are forced to offset
their contract with the long at a price which he dictates, which of
course is as high as he can prudently make it.
A squeeze is a less extreme situation than a corner. In this
case, there may not be an actual monopoly of the cash commodity
itself, but for one reason or another deliverable supplies of the
commodity in the delivery month are low, while the open inter-
est on the futures market is considerably in excess of the deli-
verable supplies. Hence, as a practical matter, most of the shorts
cannot satisfy their contracts by delivery of the commodity, and
therefore must bid against each other and force the price of the
future up in order to offset their contracts. Many squeezes do
' Id. at 58-59.
It is unlikely that the Volkart court meant more, in its reference to "profit," than
that the manipulation was pursued in search of a benefit. Later cases have so read that
statement. Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d at 1163; Hohenberg Brothers Cotton Co.,
[1975-1977 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 120,271, at 21,478.
311 F.2d at 59.
452 F.2d at 1163. Regrettably, the Cargill court's statement is sometimes hidden
behind by persons making reckless accusations of manipulation without any of the proof re-
quired in the court decisions discussed in this Article. The court of appeals in Cargill surely
did not intend that result.
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not involve intentional manipulation of futures prices, but are
caused by various natural market forces, such as unusual
weather conditions which have caused abnormally low crop pro-
duction or inadvertent destruction of a substantial volume of the
commodity itself. However, given a shortage of deliverable sup-
plies for whatever reason, the futures price can be manipulated
by an intentional squeeze where a long acquires contracts sub-
stantially in excess of the deliverable supply and so dominates
the futures market-i.e., has substantial control of the major
portion of the contracts-that he can force the shorts to pay his
dictated and artificially high prices in order to settle their con-
tracts."
B. The Commission's Definition of Manipulation
Since its creation in 1974, the Commission has addressed the ques-
tion of the elements of manipulation on two occasions. The full Commis-
sion expressed its view in Hohenberg Brothers and an ALJ discussed
the issue in Indiana Farm Bureau Cooperative Ass'n. Hohenberg, it will
be recalled, was a case charging a manipulation by shorts in the futures
market.' The full Commission in Hohenberg, however, set forth a defini-
tion of both manipulation and attempted manipulation:
[M]anipulation has been defined generally [by the courts] as con-
duct intentionally engaged in resulting in an artificial price, i.e.,
a price that does not reflect the basic forces of supply and de-
mand.
A finding of manipulation in violation of the Act requires a
finding that the party engaged in conduct with the intention of
affecting the market price of a commodity (as determined by the
forces of supply and demand) and as a result of such conduct or
course of action an artificial price was created.
An attempted manipulation, on the other hand, is simply a
manipulation that has not succeeded-that is, the conduct engag-
ed in has failed to create an artificial price. An attempted mani-
pulation requires only an intent to affect the market price of the
commodity and some overt act in furtherance of that intent.,"
The foregoing statement, as noted earlier,"1 has generated debate as to
whether the accused must have a specific intent to create artificial
prices or whether, without intending that effect, he can be found guilty
because his activities in the market were intentionally undertaken and
Id. at 1162.
[1975-1977 Transfer Binder] CoMm. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,271, at 21,472-84.
Id. at 21,477.
See text accompanying notes 191-95 supra.
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the creation of an artificial price could be expected to result from that
activity. It should be noted that the final two paragraphs of the above
quotation from Hohenberg refer specifically to an intent to affect market
prices. Despite the use of the phrase "conduct intentionally engaged in
resulting in an artificial price," which appears in the first quoted
paragraph, the more extensive discussion in the succeeding two para-
graphs, where intent to actually affect prices is repeated twice, war-
rants the conclusion that the Commission's standard is the same as that
of the courts.
The confusion over the Commission's definition, especially as to in-
tent, has arisen because of the ALJ's opinion in Indiana Farm Bureau,
where he attempted to apply a standard of inferred intent: "[A] trader
may be presumed to have foreseen the consequences (artificial prices) of
his conduct, and therefore to have 'intended' those consequences.
'" 32
However, as discussed earlier, 33 this formulatioi may be nothing more
than a rephrasing of the established principle that proof of manipulative
intent must often be based upon indirect or circumstantial evidence, and
upon the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the proven facts of the
case. A prefatory comment by the ALJ supports that conclusion: "The
manipulation cases recognize that 'intent' is a necessary element in the
offense of manipulation, but the concept remains somewhat elusive. In-
tent must be inferred from conduct; at the same time, the culpability of
the conduct depends on the intent which accompanies it."'" Since it does
not appear that either Hohenberg or Indiana Farm Bureau intended to
quarrel with pre-existing case law requiring specific intent to affect
market prices, Indiana Farm Bureau can fairly be read to require proof
of that specific intent, but to permit the establishment of such intent by
reference, at least in part, to market conduct creating a strong inference
of manipulative motive.
In Indiana Farm Bureau, the ALJ also referred to a definition of
manipulation offered by an expert'witness for the Division of Enforce-
ment. Characterizing that definition as "perceptive," he quoted the
witness' testimony that manipulation is "the socially unacceptable exer-
cise of the capacity to affect price."23
C. Congressional Efforts to Define Manipula'tion
Congress, of course, has never enacted a definition of commodity
market manipulation.23 A definition was offered, however, in the Senate
by Senator Pope some years ago:
[1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,964, at 23,860.
See text accompanying notes 193-97 supra.
[1977-1980 Transfer Binder] CoMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,964, at 23,860.
2 Id.
See text accompanying note 3 supra.
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Squeeze (congestion): These are terms used to designate a
condition in maturing futures where sellers (hedgers and specu-
lators), having waited too long to close their trades, find there
are no new sellers from who they can buy, deliverable stocks are
low, and it is too late to procure the actual commodity elsewhere
to settle by delivery. Under such circumstances and though the
market is not cornered in the ordinary sense, traders who are
long hold out for an arbitrary price."
The second sentence of Senator Pope's definition seems to identify the
event that turns a natural-and lawful-squeeze, or a natural market
congestion, into an illegal manipulation. The first gentence, standing
alone, would not meet the definition of manipulation fashioned by the
courts or by the Commission.
In 1965, the Commodity Exchange Authority; predecessor to the
present Commission, urged upon the Congress a definition of manipula-
tion for incorporation into the Act. The proposed definition was not
adopted. It seemed, however, to seek to eliminate two established
elements of the judicially-defined term, namely proof of an intent to
create artificial prices, and consideration of the legal duty of shorts to
act responsibly either to meet their delivery obligations or offset their
futures in a timely manner:
The word "manipulate" shall be construed to mean the exact-
ing, causing or maintaining of an abnormal or artificial price by
any action or course of action which raises, depresses, fixes,
pegs, or stablizes the price at or to a level different than that
which would otherwise prevail. Any such exacting, causing, or
maintaining of an abnormal or artificial price shall constitute
manipulation irrespective of any acts or omissions by the holders
of futures contracts adversely affected thereby. 8
If adopted, that definition would have eliminated the "intent" require-
ment described in Great Western Food Distributors, Inc. v. Brannan as
"a- determinative element of a punishable corner."'39 It also would have
overturned the dubious ruling in General Foods Corp. v. Brannan that
action to stabilize prices is not market manipulation.24 Finally, it would
have gutted the defense in Volkart Brothers, Inc. v. Freeman that the
shorts had brought the squeeze upon themselves by their irresponsible
failure to procure cotton for delivery when it was available to them.
2 4'
80 CONG. REC. 8089 (1936).
H.R. REP. No. 11788, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1965).
=' See 201 F.2d at 479.
240 See 170 F.2d at 230-31.
24 See 311 F.2d at 59-60.
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VIII. Procedural Issues in Manipulation Cases
A. Burden of Proof in Manipulation Cases
In an enforcement action initiated by the Commission against an
alleged manipulator, the Division of Enforcement has the burden of
proof. In Hohenberg Brothers, the Commission ruled that, even though
manipulation can be a criminal offense under section 9(b) of the Act,242
the burden of proof for the division in administrative proceedings is not
'ibeyond a reasonable doubt" but rather the establishment of the claim
"by a preponderance or weight of the evidence."243 Citing its own regula-
tion section 10.84,244 the Commission stated that the regulation:
[Ajuthorizes the ALJ to make an initial decision based on the
record in the proceedings "in conformity with the requirements
of the Administrative Procedure Act ["APA"], 5 U.S.C. § 557.
Since the ALJ is in a position to observe the demeanor of the
witnesses, the weight to be given to his finding reaches its max-
imum when these findings are based on credibility of witnesses.
In weighing the evidence, the ALJ should reach his decision bas-
ed upon "reliable, probative and substantive evidence" as re-
quired by § 7c of the Administrative Procedure Act.245
Less deference will be shown by the Commission to an ALJ's findings,
however, if the credibility of witnesses is not a key factor in the case."6
And the Commission in Hohenberg further noted that the "burden of
proof . . . includes not only the burden of. going forward with the
evidence but also the burden of persuasion.""
B.- Standard for Judicial Review in Manipulation Cases
Section 6(b) of the Act 48 provides that, on judicial review of a Com-
mission decision, the findings of fact will be deemed conclusive "if sup-
ported by the weight of evidence."
In General Foods Corp. v. Brannan, the court discussed the forego-
ing standard for judicial review in manipulation cases and concluded
that section 6(b)'s test means the preponderance or greater weight of the
evidence, rather than the less stringent "substantial evidence" test:
Thus, the standard to be employed is something other than
the "substantial evidence rule" controlling in the review of other
administrative orders.... Whatever the requirement be labeled,
242 7 U.S.C. § 13(b) (Supp. III 1979).
243 [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,271, at 21,479.
244 CFTC Initial Decisions, 17 C.F.R. § 10.84 (1980).
245 [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 120,271, at 21,479.
246 Id.
2 Id. St 21,484 n.51.
2,8 7 U.S.C. § 9 (1976).
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we think it means that petitioners are entitled to have the order
vacated unless this court concludes that it is sustained by the
weight of the evidence and to us that means the preponderance
or greater weight.249
Applying the "greater weight" test of General Foods, the same court in
G.H. Miller & Co. v. United States held that, if the Commission's Divi-
sion of Enforcement establfshes a prima facie case of manipulation and
the respondents do not present evidence in their defense, the "greater
weight" test is satisfied.10
Greater solicitude, however, toward the ALJ's findings appears in
Great Western Food Distributors, Inc. v. Brannan. There, the court plac-
ed heavy emphasis on the importance of witness demeanor and credi-
bility in manipulation cases, including the veracity and competence of
expert witnesses, and declined to engage in a "mechanical reweighing"
of the evidence." 1 First, the court observed that these factors are "often
the 'most telling part' of the evidence" which create "practical dif-
ficulties and pitfalls ... in attempting to redetermine, from an inanimate
record alone, issues such as those here presented." 2 To illustrate, the
court noted that "the intent of the parties during their trading is a deter-
minative element of a punishable corner," turning frequently upon the
veracity of witnesses:
Consequently, the demeanor of the witnesses, as they expound
the reasons behind their operations, is of substantial significance
in the referee's [now AL's] findings and conclusions. In addition,
the technical and complex nature of the charges made necessi-
tated recourse to extensive use of expert testimony, for here, as
is often the case in proceedings under regulatory statutes, the
evidence is largely of a dual nature: statistics and parol inter-
pretation of the statistics. In the latter aspect the referee again
possesses a greatly advantageous position, for, as the several ex-
perts testify, he is able to ascertain their grasp and knowledge,
their perspective and understanding of the materials presented
to them for interpretation. Their conduct on the stand may en-
hance or belie their status as experts.
2
.
Thus, the court concluded that its review of the findings and conclusions
should take into proper account the superior position of the referee or
ALJ:
It would seem, then, that the function of this court is
something other than that of mechanically reweighing the evi-
249 170 F.2d at 223-24.
260 F.2d at 290.
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dence to ascertain in which direction it preponderates; it is
rather to review the record with the purpose of determining
whether the finder of fact was justified, i.e., acted reasonably, in
concluding that the evidence, including the demeanor of the
witnesses, the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom and other
pertinent circumstances, supported his findings. To go further is
to disregard the "most telling part" of the evidence.2
This formulation of the scope of judicial review was also followed in
Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin.5 '
Neither Great Western nor Cargill expressly overruled the "greater
weight" test enunciated in General Foods and applied in G.H. Miller as
well. Since the "weight of the evidence" test is statutorily created, and
the recent judicial decisions do not profess to negate the ruling in
General Foods, it is fair to construe the cases as a whole as adopting the
"greater weight" standard, but with the admonition that the court
should not substitute its own judgment as to witness demeanor for that
of the trier of facts. Thus, where the believability of a party or witness
underpins a finding by the ALJ, the court will generally give deference
to that finding.
IX. The Puzzles of Manipulation Theory
Manipulation cases raise a number of issues that are rarely resolved
frontally. In earlier sections, certain of the unanswered puzzles have
been alluded to. For instance, it was pointed out that cash market price
reports are often so untrustworthy, and that cash market transactions
are so frequently governed by nonprice considerations, that it is
especially difficult to determine when the futures market-even one ex-
periencing a temporary "squeeze"-is really a less reliable barometer of
true value than the cash market.256 Moreover, it was noted that, by
operation of law as well as by nature, the futures market in a delivery
month becomes a local market subject primarily to local economic
pressures and conditions and, as such, its prices cannot accurately be
compared to regional, national or international commodity prices. u7
The greatest puzzle of all, however, may be whether the futures ex-
changes are truly legitimate commodity markets. The Act seems to
answer that question emphatically in the affirmative, while the case law
seems to say "no" or a weak "maybe." Section 3 of the Act 58 states that
the futures markets are "affected with a national public interest"
Id. at 479-80.
452 F.2d at 1163-64.
See text accompanying notes 150-64 supra.
See text accompanying notes 138-40 supra.
7 U.S.C. § 5 (1976).
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because their transactions are used throughout commerce "as a basis for
determining the price" of physicial commodities and are used "by ship-
pers, dealers, millers, and others engaged in handling commodities and
the products and by-products thereof" to hedge against adverse price
changes. Sections 4,19 4b,10 and 4h28' recognize that the futures markets
are also utilized for the acquisition of commodities through delivery on
futures contracts.
On the other hand, certain of the cases seem to treat futures
markets as something other than true commodity markets. While Peto
v. Howell held that a manipulation of futures contracts is an obstruction
to interstate commerce, thus implying that the futures markets are a
part of that commerce, it ruled as well that the shipment of corn into
Chicago to realize the higher price available on the futures market was,
in effect, a removal of that corn from legitimate commerce:
Here there was proof that the enhanced price in Chicago caused
the diversion of a substantial lot of available corn in the state of
Iowa and caused it to be shipped into Chicago in the latter part
of July in large quantities. The proof was that this corn would
normally go to other markets but, because of the tightness of the
market brought about by defendant, came to Chicago. This diver-
sion was clearly an interference with the current of interstate
commerce .... 262
A similar disdain for the movement of commodities out of normal
marketing channels into the futures market was expressed in Cargill,
Inc. v. Hardin.11
Another way of expressing the view that futures markets are not
bona fide commodity markets is that commercial demand for the commo-
dity is legitimate, while demand created by "shorts" in the futures
market is not. In Cargill, the court held that "there [was] no demand in
the local area" for hard wheat at the time of the alleged manipulation,'"
although it had found that the open interest in the May 1963 wheat
futures contract on that date was 8,000,000 bushels, with less than 75,000
bushels of cash wheat in deliverable position in Chicago. 65 Clearly, the
court did not perceive the shorts' needs as a legitimate demand for cash
wheat. This view was even more vividly stated in Great Western Food
Distributors, Inc. v. Brannan where the court distinguished between
"the real demand [of cash merchants], as opposed to technical demand [of
25 Id. § 6.
Id. § 6b.
' Id. § 6h.
101 F.2d at 359.
452 F.2d at 1173.
2UId.
' Id. at 1158.
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shorts] created by a cornering operation.""26 In Volkart Brothers, Inc. v.
Freeman, on the other hand, the court treated the delivery obligation of
shorts, even when supplies of the cash commodity are low, as legitimate,
remarking in fact that a different view would convert the futures
market into "a gambling institution. 26 7
Nevertheless, it is clear from the Cargill decision in particular that
delivery on futures contracts is not considered by some courts to be
legitimate, that cash markets are not to be subjected to those pressures
and, in fact, neither is the futures market. The court made clear its view
that a futures market is not functioning properly unless all shorts can
offset their contracts in lieu of delivery and, even then, without signifi-
cant market impact:
While the obligation to make or take delivety is a bona fide
feature of the futures contract, in reality the futures market is
not an alternative spot market for the commodity itself, and in-
deed the functions performed by the futures market would pro-
bably be severely hampered if it were turned into an alternative
spot market.... The main economic functions performed by the
futures market are the stabilization of commodity prices, 268 the
provision of reliable pricing information, and the insurance
against loss through price fluctuation. The functions can be ful-
filled only if both longs and shorts can offset their contracts at
non-manipulated prices. If in a squeeze situation, the shorts must
be forced either to pay manipulated prices to offset their con-
tracts or in the alternative to bring in higher priced outside sup-
plies which are neither wanted nor needed in the local market,
then both the cash and the futures markets will be dislocated.269
The Cargill court does not explain why, if the delivery obligation is a
"bona fide feature" of the futures contract, its exercise is not. The court
appears to say that, in a "squeeze"-tight cash supply-situation,
neither the cash market nor the futures market should be allowed to
reflect that fact since, if either does, a "dislocation" occurs and one or
both of those markets will be deemed to have been manipulated by the
longs. The longs are told, in effect, to "cool it" even though higher prices
are clearly attainable as the result of the shorts' strong demand for
either cash commodities or for offset. If, as the court opined, the function
of the futures market is to "stabilize" prices rather than to reflect the
26 201 F.2d at 482.
311 F.2d at 59-60.
It can only be presumed that the Cargill court's use of the term "stabilization?'
means the role of the futures market in reducing normal cash market gyrations through
hedging services and a more liquid, competitive environment. It is certainly not a purpose of
the futures markets to dictate prices or to prevent their movement.
" 452 F.2d at 1172-73.
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true forces of supply and demand, the court's rationale would be difficult
to assail. But, assuming that its use of the term "stabilization" was sim-
ply an unfortunate choice of words, then the message of Cargill is that
the demand created by shorts, though real enough, is not legitimate and
may not lawfully be reflected in the market.
Any analysis that declares that demand in the futures market is not
legitimate cuts that market loose from its historical ties with the cash
commodity market. If, as Cargill states, it is one of the "main economic
functions" of a futures market to provide to commercial dealers "reliable
pricing information," it is difficult to see how that can be achieved if
shorts are expected to stay out of the cash market, if longs are not allow-
ed to insist upon delivery, and if the futures market must register prices
that are oblivious to tight cash supplies or the "bona fide" rights and
obligations of those who transact business in the same commodities
through the futures contract.
A natural corollary to the Cargill viewpoint would be that cash mer-
chants, bidding for and offering scarce supplies, should also curtail their
competitive instincts or else face charges of manipulation. The corollary
does not hold, it appears, because vigorous bidding among cash dealers
is viewed as "legitimate," while the same phenomenon in the futures
market is not. In any event, for the time being, the practitioners would
be well advised to understand that, at least in some courts, price in-
creases in either the cash market or in the futures market that can be
traced to the needs of short futures traders will be viewed with suspi-
cion, and longs who seek the best available price under those cir-
cumstances may be charged with price manipulation.
X. Manipulation and Antitrust
Because manipulation and monopoly power are similar concepts, it is
not surprising that the antitrust laws are sometimes invoked in com-
modity market manipulation cases. Before the enactment of the Grain
Futures Act in 1922, manipulation was attacked under the Sherman
Act"' in United States v. PattenY And, as indicated in previous sec-
tions, the case of Peto v. Howell, although post-dating the creation of the
Grain Futures Act, also was grounded in the antitrust laws . 2 More
recently, the antitrust laws were invoked in Chicago Mercantile Ex-
change v. Deaktor"3 and Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange. 4
Deaktor and Ricci are best known for the rulings of the United States
Supreme Court that issues raised concerning compliance by a contract
-0 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976).
w 226 U.S. 525 (1913).
272 See 101 F.2d at 354; text accompanying notes 216-20 supra.
"1 414 U.S. 113 (1973).
21 409 U.S. 289 (1973).
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market with its duties under the Commodity Exchange Act should be
referred to the Commission for its expert views before the antitrust
claims are considered by the courtY5 And antitrust grounds were alleg-
ed in P.J. Taggares Co. v. New York Mercantile Exchange,"l where it
was held that a self-regulatory action taken by a contract market in the
face of a perceived threat of manipulation cannot be attacked under the
antitrust laws in the absence of an allegation of fraud or bad faith,"
citing the earlier case of Daniel v. Board of TradeY8
It has been held, however, that when claims under both the Com-
modity Exchange Act and the antitrust laws, for the same activity, are
asserted, the antitrust grounds may be dismissed as superfluous. In
Smith v. Groover, 9 an action alleging manipulation in the soybean
futures market, the district court dismissed antitrust counts upon find-
ing that the activity complained of was covered by the Act and that ap-
plication 6f the antitrust laws would produce inconsistent remedies and
other conflicts.28 Citing the decision in Schaefer v. First National
Bank,"' the court in Smith stated:
[W]here the law provides a special statutory remedy for specific
conduct, as well as a general provision which is comprehensive
enough to include that specific conduct and a wide variety of
other conduct, the general remedy is inapplicable.... The speci-
fic statutory prohibitions contained in the CEA, as amended,
must prevail over the general prohibitions of the Sherman
Act.282
Section 15 of the Act283 directs the Commission to consider antitrust
policy and "endeavor to take the least anticompetitive means of achiev-
ing the objectives of this act, in issuing any order or adopting any Com-
mission rule or regulation" or when requiring or approving a rule of a
contract market or registered futures association. That mandate places
the Commission directly in the mainstream of review of its own actions
and many actions of the markets and others having antitrust implica-
tions. While its duty to consider antitrust policy under section 15 refers
mainly to static rules that it or others may adopt, it also governs
414 U.S. at 115; 409 U.S. at 30,5-06.
476 F. Supp. 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
2f Id. at 76.
78 164 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1947). See also Lagorio v. Board of Trade of Chicago, 529 F.2d
1290, 1292 (7th Cir. 1976).
468 F. Supp. 105 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
u Id. at 115-17.
326 F. Supp. 1186, 1190-92 (N.D. Ill. 1970), affd, 509 F.2d 1287, 1300 (7th Cir. 1975).
22 468 F. Supp. at 116. Dismissal of the antitrust count in a complaint invoking the Act
as well can have great significance. Treble damages and attorneys' fees, available in actions
brought under the Clayton Act, are not provided for under the Act.
7 U.S.C. § 19 (1976).
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"orders" of the Commission including, presumably, any order emanating
from an administrative proceeding where a charge of market manipula-
tion has been heard and decided. Thus, the power and authority of the
Commission to resolve antitrust issues in its proceedings has existed
since the 1974 amendments to the Act, when section 15 was added.
Prior to that time, when the agency did not have such authority, the
procedure followed by the courts was to suspend the pending litigation,
refer the Act issues to the agency for its views, and then renew the
litigation in the district court to decide any issues remaining under the
antitrust laws. Today, it would appear that a full referral of all issues
would be proper, and the Commission has announced that it will receive
favorably any judicial referrals in cases where both antitrust and Act
claims may be asserted:
A significant issue of regulatory policy might be raised in
private litigation that will warrant the Commission's time and
attention. Such an issue might concern, for example, an apparent
conflict between the antitrust laws and a course of business be-
ing pursued by a contract market in the exercise of self-
regulatory responsibilities. Since the Act entrusts regulatory
policy over this type of issue to the Commission, and the resolu-
tion of this issue may be necessary before the court may reach a
decision on the merits of the case, the Commission will generally
accept referral of the antitrust issue in order to insure that the
courts may proceed with the benefit of the Commission's policy
determination.284
Thus, the Commission believes that weighing antitrust policy against
the Act's regulatory objectives has been "entrusted" to it, that it has the
right to "resolve" that issue, and that it may render a "determination"
for communication back to the trial court. It should be noted, as well,
that the Commission has stated that the procedure outlined for referral
in Ricci and Deaktor, where the district court was charged with deciding
the antitrust issues after the agency had spoken to Act-related ques-
tions, "has no doubt been affected by the enactment in 1974 of Section
15.. 28515 .... ,,8
Accordingly, it appears likely that, when a complaint alleging
manipulation is grounded in both the Commodity Exchange Act and the
antitrust laws, the court may dismiss the antitrust counts, as in Smith,
or may refer the matter to the Commission where the "public interest
reflected in the antitrust laws will be weighed against the public inter-
est protected through regulation of the futures trading industry." 286 On
41 Fed. Reg. 18,471 (1975) (emphasis added).
SId.
2" HOUSE COMM. ON AGRICULTURE, REPORT ON H.R. 13113, H.R. REP. No. 93-975, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1974).
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the other hand, where the case simply alleges a violation of the Act, a
matter that the Commission considers to be "within the normal com-
petence of the courts to resolve," the Commission will resist or refuse
referrals in most cases." 7 The Commission, however, does not cite a
claim of market manipulation as one of these matters although it oppos-
ed a referral of that issue in Smith and the court then declined to make a
referral."'
XI. Other Forms of Manipulation
By far, the most common usage of the term "manipulation" is to
describe activity of a trader or group of traders in the market that is in-
tended to raise, lower or stabilize prices of the commodity or of the
futures contract at artificial levels. All of the cases examined thus far
have been of that nature. But in Cargill Inc. v. Hardin, the court alluded
to the possibility that price manipulation might be achieved in other
ways as well: "The methods and techniques of manipulation are limited
only by the ingenuity of man."2 Standing alone, the court's statement
might suggest that manipulation would subsume a wide variety of other
wrongful conduct. However, the court then stated that manipulation en-
tails "conduct [that] has been intentionally engaged in which has
resulted in a price which does not reflect basic forces of supply and de-
mand.""29 It seems clear, therefore, that the court in Cargill meant sim-
ply to say that there are ways other than the classical corner or inten-
tional squeeze to disrupt the accuracy of market prices.
One such way is through the dissemination of false rumors and
market reports designed to precipitate a market price reaction. Section
5(c) of the Act 91 makes it a condition of contract market designation that
the exchange's governing board "provides for the prevention of dissemi-
nation by the board or any member thereof, of false or misleading or
knowingly inaccurate reports concerning crop or market information or
conditions that affect or tend to affect the price of any commodity in in-
terstate commerce." In one administrative case before the Commodity
Exchange Authority in 1950, In re Ralph W. Moore,9 a long in the
market composed and circulated a false memorandum purporting to be
from the Departments of State and Agriculture to the President describ-
ing a government plan to make heavy export sales of the same commo-
dity.293 While the false memorandum was discovered before it could have
" See text accompanying note 284 supra.
' Smith v. Groover, 468 F. Supp. at 122.
, 452 F.2d at 1163.
20 Id.
1' 7 U.S.C. § 7(c) (1976). In Cargill, the court stated that "one of the most common
manipulative devices [is] the floating of false rumors which affect futures prices .... 452
F.2d at 1163.
9 Agric. Dec. 1299 (1950).
Id. at 1303-04.
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a market impact, the respondent was found to have been guilty of
attempted manipulation."
In some instances, it appears that discrete transactions in the
futures market may result in a charge of market manipulation. In In re
David G. Henner,15 it was alleged that the respondent had purchased
futures contracts at a price significantly above the prevailing market
price in order to affect the day's closing price.298 The closing price or
range for a trading session is of special importance because it is
disseminated to the trade and influences the prices at which orders are
placed on the following day and, in addition, is used by clearing agencies
in their daily calculation of settlement prices. Thus, tampering with the
closing price or range has far-reaching consequences for the market as a
whole. This abuse, sometimes called "high balling" if a price rise is
sought or "low balling" if the objective is to depress the closing price,
was held in Henner to be a form of manipulation."7
A more difficult question is presented when noncompetitive trades
are made during a trading session. Typically, these abuses are isolated
and affect only a small portion of the total trading in the futures con-
tract. The likelihood that they will have a market-wide impact is small.
Indeed, in most instances, these trades are made well within the overall
price range of the market as a whole. Moreover, their purpose is usually
other than to have an impact on the direction or trend of market prices.
However, in Smith v. Groover, the complaint alleged prearranged trades
among certain floor brokers in soybean futures and contended that such
trading is a form of price manipulation."8 In denying a motion to dismiss
based upon the position that such activity does not constitute market
manipulation, the court said:
The practice of "bucketing" customers' orders can be just as
manipulative of futures prices as the "squeeze." If, as plaintiffs
claim, defendants executed certain futures transactions by .pre-
arrangement among themselves rather than by open outcry in
the trading pit, their conduct "manipulated" the price at which
plaintiffs traded and also affected the current quoted price for
soybean futures in the pit.... [B]y creating their own market for
trading in soybean futures, defendants insulated plaintiffs' trans-
actions from competitive forces and thereby manipulated the
price at which soybean futures were traded. '99
If, in fact, the "bucketing" of soybean futures was so pervasive and
done at prices so far "away" from the rest of the market as to affect soy-
' Id. at 1313.
211 30 Agric. Dec. 1151 (1971).
Id. at 1152.
Id. at 1174-75.
468 F. Supp. at 107.
Id. at 121.
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bean futures prices in general, the conclusion in Smith would comport
with the pre-existing body of manipulation law provided, of course, that
intent to affect the market prices is also shown. But if Smith is read to
mean that any noncompetitive trade is a manipulation, it would reflect a
major shift in the law. Noncompetitive trading that does not impact the
general market and is not intended to do so, seems far removed from the
concerns of the Congress in proscribing manipulation, namely, its impair-
ment of the ability of commercial dealers to rely upon the futures
market as a pricing and hedging mechanism."' But, if it cannot be shown
that noncompetitive trading caused general market prices to reach "arti-
ficial" levels through conduct intended to achieve that result, labeling
this practice as "manipulation" would stray from even the expansive
definition of the Cargill case. These abuses are, of course, reachable and
punishable under other provisions of the Act, such as sections 4b(D)
31
and 4c(a)(A)"2 It seems unnecessary, therefore, to strain the traditional
meaning of "manipulation" in these cases.
Two other forms of manipulation bear mention, although neither can
be properly regulated. First, there is government manipulation of
market prices, achieved mainly through programs unabashedly intended
to frustrate the laws of supply and demand. Whether it is a USDA pro-
gram to withhold supplies from the market, to retard crop production, or
to put a "ceiling" or "floor" on commodity prices; whether it is presiden-
tially or congressionally imposed price controls; or whether it is con-
certed cartel-type action by the governments of foreign producing coun-
tries, the danger is ever-present that the futures markets will not be
free to record accurately the true supply or the true demand for a com-
modity in keeping with a pure economic model.
Second, there is regulatory manipulation, where various types of
restrictions are imposed on the futures markets in the face of a real or
perceived danger that the market may "over-heat." Examples of such in-
tervention are the Commission's order of November 3, 1976 directing
the New York Mercantile Exchange under section 8a(9) of the Act 10 3 to
confine all trading in the November 1976 Maine potato futures contract
to the liquidation of then-open positions, and raising the margins on that
contract to 100 percent of the value of the commodity."' In March of
1979, the Commission unsuccessfully ordered the Chicago Board of
Trade to terminate all trading in its March wheat contract and fixed its
In Secretary of Agric. v. Massey, CEA Dockets Nos. 2 and 3 (November 9, 1933), the
Commission formed under the original Grain Futures Act held that non-competitive and
pi-e-arranged trades do not constitute manipulation under the Act. As a result, the Act was
amended in 1936 to specifically prohibit such conduct. See SENATE AGRICULTURE COMM.,
HEARINGS ON H.R. 6772, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 217-18 (1936).
7 U.S.C. § 6b(D) (1976).
2 Id. § 6c(a)(A).
33 Id. § 12a(9).
1' [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Comm. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,233, at 21,249-50.
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own settlement price for open contracts, acting again under section
8a(9). 11 And, in January of 1980, the Commission closed for two days the
grain futures markets in Chicago, Kansas City and Minneapolis under
section 8a(9) following the President's announcement of a grain embargo
to the Soviet Union."' These actions, whether or not lawful or well-
intentioned, were a direct restraint on futures market free operations
and were intended to override the ability of buyers and sellers in the
market to negotiate prices freely. Therefore, to the extent that the
markets fall short of the economic theory of "pure competition," con-
tributing factors are not limited to unlawful manipulations, intentional
squeezes or false rumors but must also include acts of government and
regulatory intervention.
" See Board of Trade of Chicago v. CFTC, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] CoMm. FUT. L.
REP. (CCH) 120,780 (N.D. Ill.), rev'd, 605 F.2d 1016 (7th Cir. 1979).
*" Comm. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) Newsletter No. 115, at 1 (January 14, 1980).
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